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ABSTRACT. This Note presents a case study in local financial development, placing
particular emphasis on the role of local political institutions in facilitating economic growth. It
presents original primary research on mortgage lending in New Haven, Connecticut in the early
nineteenth century. Before 1837, lending institutions primarily made loans to the city's social and
economic elite. But a shift occurred in the market at 1837: lending institutions abruptly began to
make significant volumes of mortgage loans to non-elite individuals with less wealth and social
standing. The Note argues that this change was driven partly by lending by the Town of New
Haven itself, which established a Town Deposit Fund with federal and state support. As the first
mortgagee to lend to a broad range of individuals, the Town expanded the city's mortgage
market and contributed to its economic development.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial institutions promote economic development. Empirical economic
research has established that the presence of financial intermediaries leads to
wealth creation.' While theorists have long disputed whether financial
institutions are a cause or effect of economic growth,2 the balance of the
argument has tipped in favor of those recognizing a causal role for banks and
other financial intermediaries.' The last few centuries have borne out the
wisdom of Alexander Hamilton: "[m]ost commercial nations have found it
necessary to institute banks; and they have proved to be the happiest engines
that ever were invented for advancing trade."4
Where these happy engines come from is much more of a mystery. A lively
scholarly debate continues over which factors contribute, or are essential, to the
creation of sound financial institutions.' This debate is not merely academic:
much of humanity lives without financial institutions or substantial economic
development. If the current debate produces coherent accounts of how and
why financial institutions form, then these insights could inform legal and
policy choices in the many jurisdictions seeking to promote economic
development.6
1. See Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right, 1o8 QJ.
ECON. 717 (1993); Ross Levine et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and
Causes, 46 J. MONETARY ECON. 31 (2000); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial
Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998).
2. Compare JOSEPH A. ScHuMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY
INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYcLE (Redvers Opie trans.,
Transaction Books ed. 1983) (1934) (asserting that financial intermediaries and credit
expansion are necessary for economic growth), with JOAN ROBINSON, THE RATE OF
INTEREST AND OTHER ESSAYS (1952) (deemphasizing the role of financial development as a
cause of economic growth). See also King & Levine, supra note 1 (introducing competing
theories of the importance of financial intermediaries and offering empirical evidence in
support of Schumpeter).
3. Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 688, 688-89 (1997) (reviewing the literature and concluding that "[a] growing
body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of
financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth
process ....").
4. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris (Apr. 30, 1781), in 3 THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 342, 362 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., Federal ed. 1904).
s. See, e.g., Sambit Bhattacharyya, Political Origins of Financial Structure, 41 J. COMP. ECON.
979, 979 (2o13) ("In spite of growing policy interest on the role of financial structure in
promoting development, very little is known about how different financial structures
emerge and evolve.").
6. See Stephen Haber et al., Political Institutions and Financial Development, in POLITICAL
INSTITTIONS AND FINAN C AL DEVELOPMENT 2 (Stephen Haber et al. eds., 20o8) (offering
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This Note seeks to contribute to this debate with an original case study. It
examines the development of institutional mortgage lending in New Haven,
Connecticut in the early nineteenth century. It focuses on this period and this
market because, around 1837, new lending institutions appeared in New Haven
and began to make a significant volume of mortgage loans to middle-class New
Haven citizens.7 Prior to 1837, the city's lending institutions primarily made
mortgage loans to an elite segment of the city's population. The speed of this
shift, as well as New Haven's documentation of mortgage lending in its Land
Records office, make the city an attractive case study. Moreover, land and
improvements to land constituted a huge portion of the nation's wealth in this
early period, and mortgage lending was an important part of the financial
system.8 The importance of accessible mortgage markets continues to the
present day. Modern development theorists have hailed the economic and
social virtues of empowering holders of real assets to borrow against them.9
In focusing on the development of a more broadly accessible mortgage
market in antebellum New Haven, this Note addresses two particular
conversations within the wider debate over the origins of financial institutions.
First, the economic history of the United States in the early nineteenth century
has served as an important case study for how and why financial institutions
emerge.1" The country's enviably rapid expansion during this period is surely
the primary reason for this sustained historical attention. But the early
nineteenth-century United States is also attractive because it was so diverse.
Different regions walked different paths to economic development but shared
some initial conditions, allowing scholars to compare the effects of regional
policy choices while controlling for other factors like cultural and legal
different policy prescriptions based on whether the legal-origins or political-institutions
view of financial institution development prevails).
7. See infra Figure 1.
8. See Robert E. Gallman, American Economic Growth Before the Civil War: The Testimony of the
Capital Stock Estimates, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STANDARDS OF LIVING BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 79 (Robert E. Gallman & John Joseph Wallis eds., 1992).
9. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) (promoting land titling as a
means of putting the value of real assets to economic use through mortgage lending). But see
Timothy Mitchell, The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes Its World, 46 EuR. J. Soc.
297 (2006) (questioning the implementation and premises of de Soto's ideas).
1o. See, e.g., HOWARD BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA: A NEW ECONOMIC
HISTORY (2003); RICHARD EUGENE SYLLA, THE AMERICAN CAPITAL MARKET, 1846-1914: A
STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1975); John Joseph
Wallis, Answering Mary Shirley's Question, or: What Can the World Bank Learn from American
History?, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 92
[hereinafter Wallis, Answering Mary Shirley's Question]; John Joseph Wallis et al., The
Interaction of Taxation and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century U.S. Banking, in THE REGULATED
ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 121 (Claudia Goldin & Gary D.
Libecap eds., 1994).
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heritage.11 This Note makes a novel contribution to the literature on New
England's development. 2 In particular, it offers New Haven's mortgage
experience after 1837 as an exception to the pattern of "insider lending," which
prevailed throughout New England at the time. 3 This Note also adds some
nuance to the division of the early United States into separate regions. In New
Haven's case, money from the sale of western lands by the federal government
had a direct impact on the city's mortgage market. Even at this early stage in
America's economic history, federalism and national policy choices had
important, even transformative, consequences for the nation's development.
The second conversation addressed by this Note concerns the role of legal
and political institutions in the development of financial institutions. In the
wider debate over the drivers of financial development, commentators have
found it useful to delineate between theories that emphasize the legal origins of
financial institutions and those that cast financial development as the result of
politics and political institutions.14 While this Note considers possible legal
origins for the 1837 shift, it ultimately sides with the political-institutions
camp. In particular, it offers an account of how the Town Deposit Fund, a local
body created with the direct political participation of New Haven's citizens,
contributed to the shift in the city's mortgage market. Many political-
institution accounts focus on the incentives and actions of governments at a
higher level -considering, for instance, the incentives of state governments to
regulate financial institutions. 5 This study adds greater depth to the political-
ii. See, e.g., HOWARD BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA:
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF NATION-BUILDING (2000)
[hereinafter BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING]; BODENHORN, supra note 1O; Hugh T.
Rockoff, Varieties of Banking and Regional Economic Development in the United States, 184o-
186o, 35 J. ECON. HIST. 16o (1975).
12. For examples of this literature, see BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING, supra note 11, at
188-89; PETERJ. COLEMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF RHODE ISLAND 1790-1860 (1963); and
NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, INSIDER LENDING: BANKS, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRIAL NEW ENGLAND (1994).
13. See LAMOREAUX, supra note 12. But see Ta-Chen Wang, Banks, Credit Markets, and Early
American Development: A Case Study of Entry and Competition, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 438 (2008)
(observing a decrease in insider lending in Plymouth County, Massachusetts in the late
183os and early 184Os).
14. See Haber et al., supra note 6, at 1-2. Compare Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why
Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003) (emphasizing the importance of
legal origins in financial development) with Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMCC GROWTH 385 (Philippe
Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005) (emphasizing the role of political dynamics in
shaping economic institutions).
15. See, e.g., Bhattacharyya, supra note 5; Stephen Haber, Political Institutions and Financial
Development: Evidence from the Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Mexico and the United
States, in POLIrICAL INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 1o;
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institutions perspective by providing a local example of how political
institutions shape financial development. Given that New England, in
particular, had a large number of small banks during the early nineteenth
century, 6 this more local perspective is valuable.
Part I of this Note introduces some terminology to describe the changes in
New Haven's mortgage market. It distinguishes capital allocation that relies on
pre-existing social networks, dubbed "Elite" lending, from capital allocation
that does not depend on pre-existing social networks, termed "Democratic"
lending. Part I also presents two datasets documenting mortgage lending in
New Haven between 18oo and 1844 and discusses the entry of new
institutional lenders into the market around 1837. The next two Parts of the
Note explore this change and its context more fully. Part II examines mortgage
lending in New Haven before 1837, describing how banks primarily conducted
Elite lending though pre-existing social networks. Part II concludes by
discussing mortgage lending by the State of Connecticut before 1837. Part III
looks at mortgage lending during and after 1837. It first examines loans made
by New Haven itself in 1837. Next, it discusses the rise of the New Haven
Savings Bank in the late 183os and early 184os. Throughout, it documents key
differences between the Elite mortgages made before 1837 and the later
mortgages made by the Town and the Savings Bank. Ultimately, Part III casts
these post-1837 loans as Democratic and more accessible to a broader range of
lenders in the community, indicating a transition in New Haven's financial
development.
Part IV proposes possible theories to explain this transition, introducing
economic, legal, and sociopolitical accounts. It supports a political-institutions
account, suggesting that government action in markets, particularly at the local
level, can encourage further economic development by private actors. In
particular, Part IV argues that political participation by a broad range of New
Haven residents in the creation of the Town Deposit Fund spurred more
widespread mortgage lending by private banking institutions. This model of
government trailblazing of markets offers several lessons for modern
development efforts. Part IV explores these lessons and points out avenues for
further research.
Richard Sylla, The Political Economy of Early U.S. Financial Development, in PoLITIcAL
INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 6o.
16. See BODENHORN, A HISTORY OP BANKING, supra note ii, at 32; see also SYLLA, supra note lo, at
79 tbl.HI-1 3 (noting that, as of 1850, New England banks had an average of $210,000 in
capital per bank, compared with $267,000 for Middle Atlantic and $395,000 for Southern
banks); Sylla, supra note 15, at 79 tbl.3.3. Nationally chartered banks, with the exception of
the Banks of the United States, did not appear until 1863. See National Bank Act of 1863, ch.
58, 12 Stat. 665.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
I. MODES OF CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND MORTGAGE LENDING IN
ANTEBELLUM NEW HAVEN
This Part introduces some terminology and the empirical foundations of
this Note. Part L.A defines and explains two terms used to describe different
types of lending in New Haven. I refer to lending before 1837 as "Elite" and
after 1837 as "Democratic." The next two sections present the empirical
foundation of this Note: two datasets constructed from primary research in the
New Haven Land Records. The first, less detailed dataset, shown in Part I.B,
examines New Haven's total mortgage market at several points in the early
nineteenth century. The second, more detailed dataset, shown in Part I.C,
documents institutional mortgage lending in the city between 18oo and 1840.
Both datasets confirm that New Haven's mortgage market changed
significantly in the late 183os, as institutional lenders began to lend in
substantial volumes for the first time.
A. Elite Versus Democratic
This Note uses two theoretical terms to describe New Haven's mortgage
market: "Elite" and "Democratic." 17 I use these terms as shorthand to refer to
several interrelated but distinct attributes of lending within an economy. These
features include the participation of a financial intermediary, the methods of
identification and evaluation of borrowers and their ability to repay, the
complexity of loan terms, and the means of pooling capital to make loans.
Because several different loan attributes are incorporated into the terms "Elite"
and "Democratic," it is best to think of loans as existing along a spectrum
bounded by these terms. Particularly during periods of economic change, many
loans will have both Elite and Democratic characteristics. My purpose in using
these terms is not to delineate hard-edged analytical categories, but rather to
concisely describe a complex shift in New Haven's mortgage market.
I use "Elite" to describe a mode of lending in which capital remains within
pre-existing social networks, usually populated by wealthy borrowers and
lenders known to each other. Elite lending is characterized by the identification
and evaluation of borrowers through social connections (rather than through
financial intermediaries with bureaucratic expertise) and capital pooling
methods that require significant wealth for individuals to participate as lenders.
An idealized Elite loan might be a bespoke mortgage from one wealthy
landowner to another, funded with the lender's individual wealth. In several
17. For a more comprehensive review of capital allocation methods across economic history that
inspired the terms used here, see generally Peter Temin, Financial Intermediation in the Early
Roman Empire, 64 J. EcON. HIST. 705 (2004).
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respects, mortgage lending in New Haven prior to 1837 can be characterized as
Elite.
As opposed to Elite, I use the term "Democratic" to describe a mode of
lending where access to credit does not depend on pre-existing social networks.
Democratic lending typically involves financial intermediaries that rely on
bureaucratic expertise to evaluate borrowers and methods of capital pooling
that enable the non-rich to lend money to others. An idealized Democratic loan
would be a standardized mortgage from a deposit-taking bank to a borrower
identified and approved by specialized bank staff. After 1837, mortgage lending
in New Haven became significantly more Democratic.
Before putting these terms to use, I would like to offer a few caveats and
clarifications. First, I do not mean to cast either Democratic or Elite lending as
necessarily more normatively desirable than the other. To modern ears, Elite
lending may sound socially objectionable or unfair. It is true that Elite capital
allocation may overlook or undervalue economic opportunities that exist
outside of established social networks. But when information is costly and
transactions costs are high, Elite lending may offer significant benefits. Parties
can quickly and cheaply use pre-existing relationships to evaluate each other as
borrowers and lenders. For instance, Naomi Lamoreaux has documented how
kinship networks facilitated the allocation of capital throughout industrializing
New England.'8 Early New England banks were often controlled by directors
who used the corporate form to accumulate capital and then direct funds to
their own economic projects, making themselves the primary borrowers of
their banks' money. According to Lamoreaux, these insider banks were
"[e] ngines of economic development" for the region. 9
Second, I should distinguish my terminology from that of Lamoreaux.
Lamoreaux uses the term "insider lending" to describe the pattern of bank
directors' lending to kin or friends.2' In Part II.A, I argue that institutional
mortgage lending in New Haven before 1837 can properly be considered
"insider lending." However, throughout the remainder of this Note, I use
"Elite" instead of "insider" for several reasons. First, the Elite-Democratic
terminology better highlights the shift in New Haven's mortgage market that
is the main subject of this Note. My focus on greater accessibility in a local
mortgage market is narrower than Lamoreaux's, as she makes far-reaching
observations about lending patterns and industrial development across New
England. Second, outright kinship networks do not appear to play as great a
role in New Haven as in other areas of New England, and I have not been able
18. LAMOREAUX, supra note 12; Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Banks, Kinship, and Economic
Development: The New England Case, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 647 (1986).
19. LAMOREAUX, supra note 12, at 52.
20. Id.
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to document the social status and social ties of borrowers and lenders as
thoroughly as Lamoreaux. In light of this, I want to avoid overextending or
misapplying her term. Nevertheless, it does appear that New Haven's Elite
lending can be understood as a version of Lamoreaux's insider lending, and the
lower frequency of kinship lending may simply be a minor aberration in an
otherwise uniform New England landscape.
One final point on terminology: I have chosen the term "Democratic" with
an eye to the political context of the shifts in the mortgage market. In the 23rd
Congress, in session from 1833 to 1834, the entire Connecticut delegation was
either Anti-Jacksonian or Whig (with the possible exception of Ebenezer
Young, whose partisan affiliation is unclear but who began his political career
as a Federalist)." In the 1834 elections, every Connecticut Representative was
replaced by a Jacksonian or Democrat; neither of the Connecticut Senators
were up for election. In 1836, the Senators' time came, and by the 25th
Congress (1837-1838), every member of Connecticut's delegation was a
Jacksonian Democrat. The details of Connecticut's political history and the
Jacksonian sweep are beyond the scope of this Note, but in choosing the
"Democratic" label, I do wish to suggest the possible connections between the
political backdrop of the times and New Haven's economic democratization.
B. Institutional Versus Non-Institutional Lending in New Haven's Mortgage
Market
In order to map New Haven's mortgage market, I constructed two datasets
using the archives of the New Haven Land Records. Before introducing these
datasets, some background on land records and mortgage law in early
nineteenth-century Connecticut may be useful. At the time, mortgages
consisted of a promissory note or other instrument pledging repayment of a
debt and an associated deed transferring ownership in real property to a
mortgagee. As legal documents transferring title, these mortgage deeds were
recorded in local land records. Most of them took the form of warranty deeds
and, in New Haven at least, were recorded on standard warranty deed forms or
using standard warranty deed language -the same forms and language used
for warranty deeds transferring title upon sale. However, unlike warranty
deeds transferring title upon sale, mortgage deeds contained (always-
handwritten) voiding provisions invalidating the deed if the associated
21. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774-Present, U.S. CONG.,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (search "Connecticut" in the State
field and "23" in the Year or Congress field). For a brief biography of Ebenezer Young, see
Young, Ebenezer, (1783-1851), U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay
.pl?index=Yoooo34 [http://perma.cc/48JQDDF4].
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promissory note was timely repaid. The language of these voiding provisions
suggests that mortgage deeds transferred title from mortgagors to mortgagees
outright, with satisfactory repayment of a debt reversing the transfer. In legal
terms, however, mortgage deeds did not transfer tide on their own. In 1843, the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut confirmed that mortgagees held only
a security interest in a mortgaged property, subscribing to the lien theory of
mortgages.' Title remained with the mortgagor until a mortgagee obtained a
foreclosure decree from a local superior court.' Even the foreclosure decree did
not transfer title to the mortgagee. It merely began a redemption period during
which a mortgagor could make good on her debt and retain title to her land.
Redemption periods varied depending on the foreclosure decree, but they
appear to have lasted six months to a year.' 4 Only once this redemption period
expired did a mortgage deed effectively transfer title from a borrower to a
lender.2'
In New Haven, all recorded deeds are held in archives attached to the
Town Clerk's Office. Assembling the mortgage deeds for a given period allows
for reconstruction of the size and details of the city's mortgage market at a
certain time. The first dataset I constructed documents New Haven's total
mortgage market in the 183os and 184os. I reviewed every mortgage deed
recorded in the archives for three six-month periods-the first six months of
1830, 1835, and 1844-and checked whether an individual or an institution
made each mortgage loan. I chose the time periods for the first dataset to detect
and confirm when institutional lenders began to account for a substantial share
of New Haven's mortgage market. I focused on the institutional status of the
lender on the admittedly rough assumption that individual lenders would be
unable to engage in substantial volumes of Democratic lending. Individuals
generally lack the expertise and bureaucratic resources to evaluate large
22. See Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556, 56o (1843) ("The mortgagee has merely a lien upon the
property for the security of his debt ...."). The Connecticut Supreme Court had previously
referred to a mortgage as a "lien" without addressing the exact lien versus title theory issue.
See Hubbard v. Savage, 8 Conn. 215, 218-21 (1830).
23. See Bassett v. Mason, 18 Conn. 131, 132-33 (1846).
24. See, e.g., Atwood v. Vincent, 17 Conn. 575, 578 (1846) (citing a February 1842 foreclosure
decree "limiting the time of redemption ... to the first Monday of September 1842"); Cooper
v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556, 5S7 (1843) (citing a January 1842 decree of foreclosure limiting the
time of redemption to the first Monday of July 1842); Avery v. Kellogg, 11 Conn. 562, 562-63
(1836) (citing a March 1833 decree of foreclosure limiting the time of redemption to the first
Monday of January 1834).
2s. Connecticut mortgage law operated under a "strict foreclosure" regime, under which land
was transferred to the mortgagee even if its value exceeded the original debt. See Bassett, 18
Conn. at 137. For more background on redemption periods and strict foreclosure
proceedings, see generally GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER,
FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 112-16 (7th ed. 2006).
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numbers of strangers as trustworthy borrowers. A mortgage market without
institutional lenders will therefore likely be dominated by Elite lending. 6 To
construct the dataset, I located the volumes in the archives that contain deeds
for the relevant periods, noted whether each deed was a mortgage deed, and, if
so, recorded whether the lender was a financial intermediary or a private
individual (or a group of private individuals) and the amount of the mortgage.
This process involved reviewing 2,172 individual deeds recorded in the Land
Records. 7 Table i summarizes the dataset8:
26. My assumption is that institutional lending is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
Democratic lending: institutional lenders, of which New Haven had several before 1837, do
not necessarily lend Democratically. In Part II, I consider the question of whether
institutional lending before and after 1837 was Elite or Democratic.
27. Note that the dataset may nonetheless not include ioo% of the mortgages for these periods.
Deeds are organized into roughly three categories in the Land Records archives: warranty
deeds printed on forms containing some basic warranty deed language, quitclaim deeds
printed on forms containing some basic quitclaim deed language, and bespoke "manuscript"
deeds that contained no printed form language. All of the deeds contain some individualized
handwritten material. For instance, as previously mentioned, mortgage deeds were generally
recorded on warranty deed forms with handwritten voiding provisions. But the manuscript
deeds are entirely handwritten. They often continue for many pages and are generally used
for explaining more exotic real estate transfers. For instance, many probate transfers are
recorded in manuscript form. Most of the volumes in the Land Records archives contain
warranty deeds or quitclaim deeds (or some combination of both). I reviewed all of the
relevant warranty and quitclaim deed volumes for the first six months of 1830, 1835, and
1840. However, I did not review the manuscript volumes for these periods. Doing so would
have required deciphering many hundreds of pages of handwritten early nineteenth-century
script. Accordingly, the dataset may underestimate the total number of mortgages
originated during this period. This underestimation should be minimal. One estimate of its
magnitude comes from the database introduced in Part I.C, which contains detailed
information on the hundreds of institutional mortgages originated from 18oo and 1844. Of
the 174 mortgages originated by the New Haven Savings Bank during the period, only six,
or 3.4%, were recorded in manuscript volumes. (Mortgage deeds in manuscript volumes
originated by specific mortgagees can be located easily using the archives' indexes.)
Consistent with the unusual nature of many of the manuscript deeds, it appears, then, that
mortgages were only rarely recorded in the manuscript volumes. Based on the proportion of
New Haven Savings Bank mortgages appearing in manuscript form, it is probably safe to
say that the dataset underlying Table i underestimates the total number of mortgages in
New Haven by around S%.
aS. The dollar amounts in Table i are given in terms of 183o dollars. I adjusted the amounts for
inflation using a time series from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. See
Consumer Price Index (Estimate) 18oo-, FFD. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS,
https ://www.minneapolisfed.org/community-education/teacher/calc/hist8oo.cfm [http://
perma.cc/C5TD-VVK3]. Prices are presented in contemporary, nominal values except
where inflation-adjusted as noted.
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Table I.
TOTAL MORTGAGE LENDING IN NEW HAVEN
First Six Months First Six Months First Six Months
of 1830 of 1835 of 1844
Number Amount Number Amount Numbe Amount(1830 USD) (1830 USD) (1830 USD)
Mortgages
Originated by
Individual 85 $70,402 137 $145,813 175 $167,013
Lenders
Mortgages
Originated by $8oo 0 $0 36 $58,686
Institutions
Total Mortgages 86 $71,202 137 $145,813 211 $225,698
Table i displays several important trends in New Haven's mortgage
market. First, it confirms that the early nineteenth century was a period of
dynamic growth. The town's mortgage market more than doubled between
183o and 1844, in terms of the number of loans and the total amount lent.
Second, the market share of institutional lenders abruptly increased in the late
1830s, from virtually 0% in 183o and 1835 to 26% of the total amount loaned in
1844. In addition, although the number of mortgages made by non-
institutional lenders increased by 27% between 1835 and 1844, the total dollar
amount loaned increased by only 15%. This pattern suggests that a structural
shift took place in the New Haven mortgage market in the late 1830s: as the
total amount of capital disbursed by individuals hit a ceiling, financial
intermediaries appeared and began to provide another source of capital to
borrowers. Moreover, although not shown in Table 1, the average size of a
non-institutional mortgage in the first six months of 1844 was $835, whereas
the average institutional mortgage was $1,426.29 The relative sizes of
institutional and non-institutional mortgages further support the view that
New Haven's mortgage market progressed from one type of capital allocation
to another in the late 183os. Because they could assemble larger amounts of
capital and pool risks beyond social networks, expertise-based lenders may
have been better equipped to make larger loans than private individuals.
Overall, Table i and the data behind it indicate that the changes in New
Haven's mortgage market between 1835 and 1844 were different from the
changes between 183o and 1835. The changes between 183o and 1835 were
changes of degree: mortgage activity, although consistent in character, became
29. See Database of Total Mortgages (on file with author).
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more frequent. But the changes between 1835 and 1844 included a shift in
sources of capital and the type of lending.
This is not to say that financial intermediaries categorically replaced
individual mortgage lenders after the late 183os. By 1844, institutional lenders
constituted only about a quarter of the mortgage market-although it is
possible that this proportion increased as the New Haven Savings Bank and
similar institutions grew. Regardless of the exact market shares of institutional
and non-institutional lenders during the rest of the nineteenth century, private
individuals continued to play a significant role in New Haven's mortgage
market into the early twentieth century.3 However, the increased participation
of financial intermediaries after 1837 appears to have been a permanent shift,
with ostensibly profound economic consequences over a long period of time.
For example, the New Haven Savings Bank, founded in 1838 and responsible
for the bulk of the institutional lending in the 184os, remained active until
2004, when it underwent a successful merger with two other regional banks.31
The remainder of this Note sets aside the question of the relative
magnitude of institutional versus non-institutional lending in New Haven.
Instead, it focuses on why, when, and how the shift towards institutional
lending occurred. It also asks whether the shift towards institutional lending
was in fact a shift towards Democratic lending. This Note concentrates on the
shift itself instead of documenting the extent of its ramifications because a turn
to institutional and Democratic lending in a developing economy is an
important but by no means inevitable step. The social, legal, and economic
forces responsible for such shifts are poorly understood. With this puzzle in
mind, the following section introduces the second dataset drawn from the
Land Records. It presents the story of institutional lending in New Haven in
much greater detail.
C. Institutional Lending in New Haven: 18oo-1844
The dataset introduced in Part I.B does not provide much clarity on when
exactly the shift in New Haven's mortgage market occurred or what entities
were responsible for it. In order to examine these issues more closely, I
constructed a second dataset of the 355 mortgages in New Haven originated by
a state-chartered bank or the state or local government between 18oo and 1844.
30. Lisa Marshall, New Haven's Mortgage Markets in an Era of Urbanism (2004) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the New Haven Museum) (documenting the prevalence of
mortgage lending between private individuals, including neighbors, in late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century New Haven).
31. Merger Decisions, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 3 (2004), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual
/merger/2oo4/Merger2004.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3E-FM4K].
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I began the dataset at 18oo and ended it at 1844 for several reasons. First,
although the overall ratios between institutional and non-institutional lending
given in Table 1 for 183o and 1835 are broadly representative of the period, the
almost complete lack of institutional lending in 183o and the total lack of
institutional lending in 1835 are slightly anomalous. Financial intermediaries
did make some loans before the late 183os. To understand this early
institutional lending, I examined the earliest decades of the century as well. I
extended the dataset through 1844 to gain as much visibility after the Panic of
1837, a nationwide financial crisis, as possible. Although it may have been
useful to extend the dataset further into the 184os, the New Haven Savings
Bank was making so many mortgages by 1845 that assembling comprehensive
data on later years became arduous. A less rigorous review of deeds through
the end of the 1840s confirmed that the trends shown in the dataset continued
throughout the decade. To construct the dataset, I used the archives' grantor-
grantee indexes. For each mortgage originated by one of the seven state-
chartered banks and two government entities active as mortgagees before 1844,
I recorded the date of the mortgage, its amount, its term (if given), all
mortgagors, and all mortgagees." Figures i and 2 present the results of this
primary research, in terms of volume of mortgages originated by institutions
and the total amount lent.3
These graphs tell the story of Table i in greater detail: in the late 183os and
early 1840s, institutional lenders began to make more mortgages and lend out
more money overall."4 But the shift was not as abrupt as Table I might make it
seem. Institutional lenders were active, although erratically and at relatively
low levels, before 1837. Moreover, the increase in institutional lending was not
monotonic. After a flurry of loans in 1837, institutional lending fell back,
although never to its pre-1837 levels, before picking up steam again in the early
184os. Further analysis reveals that the 1837 peak was driven by a different
lender than the bank driving the rise of institutional lending in the early 1840s.
32. I also coded the property description given in the mortgage based on whether it used an
address, physical landmarks, neighbors' holdings, or other more technical methods to
describe the mortgaged property. Although I ultimately did not use this data in this Note,
most mortgages during the period described the property at issue with reference to streets
and neighbors' landholdings.
33. I adjusted the dollar amounts of mortgages per year in Figure 2 for inflation using a time
series made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. See FED. RESERVE BANK
OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 28.
34. A third aspect of this same shift, which is harder to see in Figures 1 and 2, is that the average
size of mortgages also decreased after 1837 because the volume of mortgages rose more
rapidly than the total amounts loaned out. The social significance of this shift is discussed in
greater detail in Part I1I.B.
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Figures 3 and 4 show institutional lending from 18oo and 1844 broken down by
mortgagee.
Figure 1.
VOLUME OF INSTITUTIONAL MORTGAGES PER YEAR
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While the lending data presented in Figures 1-4 confirm that the city's
mortgage market underwent a shift in the late 183os, they raise several
important questions. First, given that banks did make mortgage loans earlier in
the nineteenth century, can the shift at 1837 be cast as a transition from Elite to
Democratic lending? Second, given that two of the most active institutions in
New Haven's mortgage market were public entities, how did governmental
activities shape the city's financial development? Finally, why did the change
happen when it did? Parts II, III, and IV address these questions.
II. MORTGAGE LENDING IN NEW HAVEN BEFORE 1837
This Part examines institutional mortgage lending in New Haven before
1837. Part II.A discusses bank lending activity and considers whether pre-1837
bank lending had more Elite or Democratic characteristics. In particular, it asks
whether bank lending before 1837 fits with the "insider lending" model of New
England banking in the nineteenth century. Part II.B focuses on mortgage
lending by the State of Connecticut before 1837. Overall, both bank lenders and
the State before 1837 are more appropriately categorized as Elite lenders
because they relied on pre-existing social networks to allocate capital.
A. Bank Lending Before 1837
Early institutional lending complicates the claim that the increased
participation by institutional lenders in the late 183os can be cast as a
straightforward transition from Elite to Democratic lending. In particular, it
suggests that the shift in 1837 was more of an acceleration of existing
Democratic activity than a discrete transition from Elite to Democratic lending.
However, categorizing early bank mortgages in New Haven as Democratic
activity would be an oversimplification, one that mistakenly equates
institutional lending with Democratic lending. In early nineteenth-century
New England, the prevailing pattern was in fact for banks to operate within
pre-existing social and kinship networks instead of solving information- and
transaction-cost problems through specialized expertise." Lamoreaux has
dubbed this phenomenon "insider lending" and has documented its dominance
throughout New England in the nineteenth century. 6 However, Connecticut
banks do not feature prominently in Lamoreaux's extensive work on insider
lending. Bodenhorn mentions some New Haven banks but also does not focus
3S. See BODENHORN, supra note lo, at 91 ("Records from the period show that many, if not
most, banks loaned predominantly to insiders."); LAMORF.AUX, supra note 12; Temin, supra
note 17, at 711.
36. See LAMOREAUX, supra note 12.
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on Connecticut.37 Examining New Haven's early nineteenth-century mortgage
market therefore provides an opportunity to test the prevailing account of New
England's early banking system as well as to determine whether early mortgage
lending was more Elite or Democratic. The following sections consider the
banks that made mortgage loans in the city prior to 1837.38 The overwhelming
majority of these loans - about 87,/o - came from the New Haven Bank, and its
origins and practices receive the most scrutiny. But other bank mortgagees are
also discussed in Part II.A.2. Overall, New Haven's pre-1837 bank mortgage
market fits with the insider-lending account of New England banking during
this era: mortgage loans were made by institutions controlled by the city's
socioeconomic and business elite and for members of this same group.
1. The New Haven Bank
The New Haven Bank, New Haven's oldest bank and the twelfth-oldest
bank in the United States,39 was born at the home of Thomas Atwater, a scion
of one of New Haven's most historically prominent families.4' New Haven
residents gathered at a meeting there on February 16th, 1792, to draft a petition
to the Connecticut General Assembly to charter a bank in New Haven.4' The
petition was approved later that year.'
The New Haven Bank accumulated capital through sale of stock, which its
Act of Incorporation set at $200 per share.43 The Act of Incorporation also
established that the Bank would be led by a nine-person Board of Directors,
voted into office by its shareholders.' The Bank's Directors not only controlled
37. BODENHORN, supra note lo, at 72, 86.
38. The city's ill-fated first mutual savings bank, the Saving Bank of New Haven, made one
mortgage loan during this period. Because of the later success of the New Haven Savings
Bank, the city's second mutual savings bank, this mortgage and the short and unhappy life
of the Saving Bank of New Haven are discussed in Part II.B instead of here.
39. Sylla, supra note 15, at 78 tbl.3.2.
40. WILLAM F. HASSE, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN NEw HAVEN, CONNECTICUT 5 (1946) (citing
an advertisement in The Connecticut Journal on Feb. 15th, 1792).
41. Id. at 5-6. At the time, the legislature had to pass a specific act to create a banking
corporation. In practice, however, this was not much of a barrier. New England had a de
facto "free banking" system by the early nineteenth century- meaning that state legislatures
generally granted charters to just about anyone who petitioned for one. See Wallis,
Answering Mary Shirley's Question, supra note lo, at iii.
4z. See HASSE, supra note 40, at 5-6.
43. An Act to Incorporate the New-Haven Bank, in THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAws OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT, AS REVISED AND ENACTED BY Ti-E GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN MAY 1821, at 69
(Zephaniah Swift et al. eds., 1821).
44. Id. at 69-70. Each Director had to be a shareholder of the Bank as well. Id. at 6.
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the Bank but also likely served as major sources of capital for it. Its Boards
during the early nineteenth century were made up of the city's social and
business leaders: the annual results of its internal elections read like a "who's
who" list of New Haven's patrician elite.45 Moreover, despite a provision in its
Act of Incorporation requiring that "[n]ot more than three fourths of the
directors in office ... shall be eligible as directors the next succeeding year,"
46
the Board's membership was quite stable across the early nineteenth century.47
Many of the Bank's Directors shared the same last name.
48
It is unsurprising that the oldest bank in New Haven would be helmed by
the city's elite. The composition of its borrowers is the real test of insider
lending.49 Outright kinship bonds appear to have existed between the Bank's
Directors and its mortgagees in twenty-eight percent of its mortgage loans
before 1837.5" While this is on the low end of Lamoreaux's examples, it still
represents a significant portion of the Bank's mortgage portfolio."1 Other
details suggest that, even when Directors were not related by blood to the
Bank's mortgagees, its borrowers were drawn from a wealthy, sophisticated
segment of New Haven society. First, the loans were relatively large, averaging
$2,358 dollars, a large sum of money at the time." Because borrowers had to
put up sufficient real estate to secure these large loans, most likely only
45. See Record Books of the New Haven Bank (on file with the New Haven Museum)
[hereinafter Record Books].
46. An Act to Incorporate the New-Haven Bank, in SwIFT, supra note 43, at 70.
47. Record Books, supra note 45. Caleb Brintwall, for instance, left the Board in 1838, only to
return in 1840.
48. Id. For instance, Stephen Huggins was a Director in 1822; Henry Huggins was a Director in
1836,
49. While the Bank conducted substantial non-mortgage activities, the present analysis is
confined to its mortgage lending.
so. I calculated this number by comparing the last names of pre-1837 mortgagees with the last
names of Directors for this period. Eleven out of the Bank's thirty-nine mortgages between
18oo and 1837 went to individuals who shared a surname with a past or future Director.
This estimate may be conservative because loans to businesses were coded as non-kinship
loans, although kinship ties may have existed between business leaders or firms may have
had interlocking Boards. I stress, however, that this is only an estimate: using last names as
proxies for kinship relationships is, at bottom, an uncertain inference.
51. While Lamoreaux reports examples in this neighborhood, she also finds instances of
extremely high rates of insider lending. See LAMotREAux, supra note 12, at 15-17, 16 n.13.
However, in some of the highest cases she found, banks were controlled by specific families.
For instance, up to eighty-four percent of one Rhode Island bank's loans were to "three
interrelated families that controlled the bank." Id. at 16. The New Haven Bank does not
seem to have been so firmly under the control of a single kinship group.
Sa. Database of Institutional Mortgages 18oo-i844 (on file with author) [hereinafter Database
of Institutional Mortgages].
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members with considerable wealth and social status received them. 3 Few
residents of New Haven had "new brick dwelling houses" like the ones
mortgaged by Ira Atwater and Addin Lewis in 1826 and 1827.' Second, the
terms and structure of many of the Bank's loans were sophisticated, in that
they varied loan-to-loan and could grow quite complex. For instance, in 1817,
the Bank, Russell Hotchkiss, Walter Budington and several other citizens
participated in a complicated deal in which the Bank purchased a mortgage
securing a bundle of Budington's loans, including one originally from the Bank
itself, from Hotchkiss."s In addition, in contrast to many post-1837 institutional
mortgages, the terms of the Bank's mortgages were not standardized,
suggesting that they resulted from specific negotiations between the Bank and
savvy customers.56 In 1821, for example, the New Haven Bank made four
S3. Note that this point and others throughout this Note rely on a link between wealth and
social status. Land holdings constituted the main source of wealth in the American economy
in the early nineteenth century. See Gallman, supra note 8. In addition, a wealthy, land-
owning patrician elite descended from long-established families controlled New Haven
politics. See generally ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNs?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERaCAN CITY (2d ed. 2005) (describing the sociopolitical development of the city). The
socioeconomic realities of the time justify the inferential step from wealth to social status.
54. Mortgage Deed at Vol. 74, p. 444 of Land Records (Aug. 28, 1827); Mortgage Deed at Vol.
74, P. 276 of Land Records (Oct. 4, 1826); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 74, p. 268 of Land Records
(Sept. 14, 1826).
5. Mortgage Deed at Vol. 66, p. 91 of Land Records (Mar. 17, 1817).
S6. By current standards, most of the mortgages in New Haven in the early nineteenth century
were very short-term, with many coming due in a matter of months. This is consistent with
American antebellum banking more broadly. See BODENHORN, supra note lo, at 55 tbl.3.i.
However, renewals appear to have been common practice during this period as well,
although there was substantially more regional variation in this respect. Id. at 56. Renewal
rates in New Haven are unclear as few of the promissory notes associated with the mortgage
deeds survive. However, a promissory note issued by the New Haven Savings Bank in 1843
that includes the actual repayment schedule of the loan suggests that banks were
comfortable with renewals and that the short terms of some loans were not as harsh as they
appeared: the borrower of the surviving note did not begin to make principal payments
until 1851, despite the note being "payable on demand, for value received." See Promissory
Note between New Haven Savings Bank and unknown individual, Oct. 6, 1843, New Haven
Historical Society, Manuscript File # 76, Box 4, Folder A. Moreover, analysis of releases for
some of the mortgages in this Note's database suggests that many loans were not repaid on
time or were renewed. This analysis is inconclusive, however, because the Land Records do
not contain an associated release for every mortgage deed. It should also be noted that
interest rates were largely set by usury laws during this period. The mortgage deeds do not
contain interest rates for their associated loans, but, most likely, all of the loans were close to
the legal limit of 6%. For an extended discussion of the effects of usury laws and interest
rates in antebellum capital markets, including New England, see BODENHORN, supra note
10, at 72-94.
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mortgages, none of which became payable on the same schedule.' Finally,
some of the Bank's loans were used to finance commercial activities, such as
two mortgage loans totaling $7,000 to the New Haven Tontine Company in
1827 and 1828.8 The Company operated the Tontine Hotel, the city's main
hostelry and an important local business enterprise. Lending to commercial
ventures suggests that the New Haven Bank aimed for more sophisticated
clients with greater financial resources than the average New Haven
individual.59 In sum, then, the mortgage activities of the New Haven Bank and,
by extension, most of the mortgage lending made in the town prior to 1837
were not accessible to individuals outside of the city's socioeconomic elite.
Although only twenty-eight percent of the mortgage loans were prototypical
examples of insider lending-loans where some kinship relationship existed
between the borrower and the Bank Board- other attributes of the remaining
loans place them within Elite networks.
2. Other Bank Lenders
Few banks besides the New Haven Bank were active in the mortgage
market before 1837. However, loans made by these other banks appear to be
even more embedded in pre-existing social and economic arrangements. The
only years with significant mortgage lending activity by other banks were 1812
and 1829. In 1812, the Bank of Bridgeport made a $iS,ooo loan to Elisha
Atwater, Ward Atwater, and Henry Daggett. The purpose of this loan is
unclear, but its size and the involvement of the Bank of Bridgeport were
anomalous. 6' The Atwaters and Daggetts were socially prominent families
within the New Haven community, and both were represented on the Board of
the New Haven Bank.2 In 1829, the Mechanics Bank of New Haven, which
57. See Mortgage Deed at Vol. 69, p. 116 of Land Records (Feb. 21, 1821); Mortgage Deed at
Vol. 70, p. 218 of Land Records (Dec. 11, 1821); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 70, p. 317 of Land
Records (Dec. 17, 1821); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 70, p. 322 of Land Records (Dec. 27, 1821).
s8. Mortgage Deed at Vol. 75, p. 103 of Land Records (Nov. 23, 1827); Mortgage Deed at Vol.
75, p. 171 of Land Records (July 18, 1828).
59. Note that, although the New Haven Tontine Hotel was a more sophisticated mortgagee
than the average New Haven individual, the hotel itself was financed with significant
community participation: 300 New Haven residents bought into the tontine at $1oo
per share. See Prize for 83-Year Futurity Matures, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 19o8,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.htrml?res=9CoDEoDF173iE233A2575ACZA96F9C949
97D6CF [http://perma.cc/9JRH-WKAJ.
60. See supra Figure 4. Again, the much smaller mortgage made by the Savings Bank of New
Haven is not discussed here but is considered later in the Note. See infra Part I.A.
61. Mortgage Deed at Vol. 60, p. 485 of the Land Records (Jan. 4, 1812).
62. See Record Books supra note 45.
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had been chartered in 1824 to finance the Farmington Canal,6 3 made a $26,328
mortgage loan to the Farmington Canal Company.64 The Company mortgaged
nearly the entire canal and threw in a wharf for good measure.6' The
Mechanics Bank would eventually place $200,000 of its roughly $500,000
capital stock in ownership of the Farmington Canal Company; after the Canal
failed, the bank lost this investment, a huge blow.6 6 Because of the Bank's
significant ownership interest in the Canal, the Canal's fraught history, and the
significant assets transferred in the 1829 mortgage deed, it is not clear exactly
how to interpret the Canal mortgage -it was likely part of a larger, complex
financing arrangement between the Mechanics Bank and the Farmington Canal
Company. 67 Regardless of the details of any such arrangement, it seems safe to
cast the loans made by the Mechanics Bank and the Bank of Bridgeport as
complicated, commercial mortgages that came out of pre-existing social and
economic relationships.
Overall, this section's examination of mortgage lending by banks in New
Haven before 1837 affirms the characterization of the later shift in the market as
a shift from Elite to Democratic lending. In particular, lending before 1837
underscores the fact that banks can operate more like friends and family of
borrowers than as impersonal financial intermediaries relying on expertise to
interact with unknown economic actors. New Haven's banks before 1837 were
profoundly patrician and operated as Elite rather than Democratic lenders.
However, in order to fully characterize the shift as Elite to Democratic, it is
necessary to establish that the loans after 1837 were not of the same patrician
character. Part III undertakes this analysis. Before moving on to this question,
however, an important and largely unexplored historical wrinkle in New
Haven's financial development must be addressed. Specifically, Part II.B
considers the role of the State of Connecticut as an important mortgage lender
in New Haven before 1837.
B. State Lending Before 1837
A substantial volume of loans in early nineteenth-century New Haven were
made by state and local governments. In particular, before 1837, the State of
63. HASSE, supra note 40, at 21.
64. Mortgage Deed at Vol. 77, p. 437 of Land Records (Aug. 13, 1829).
6S. Id.
66. HASSE, supra note 40, at 22-23.
67. The fraught history of the Canal is discussed in some detail in NEW HAVEN &
NORTHAMPTON RAILROAD, AN AccOuNT OF THE FARMINGTON CANAL COMPANY; OF THE
HAMPSHIRE AND HAMDEN CANAL COMPANY; AND OF THE NEw HAVEN AND NORTHAMPTON
COMPANY, TILL THE SUSPENSION OF ITS CANALS IN 1847 (1850).
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Connecticut was the largest and most frequent individual mortgagee in the city
after the New Haven Bank.68 This section considers the State's pooling and
dissemination of capital during this period and whether State lending activities
had Elite or Democratic attributes.
The classic method by which governments pool capital is taxation.
Taxation, at least in its modern form, has many Democratic attributes. Systems
of taxation are designed to capture all individuals, regardless of their social
connections. They are bureaucratic and rely on standardized processes. 6' But
the State of Connecticut did not fund its pre-1837 loans through taxation. Even
if the political will had existed for such an arrangement, there was not a great
deal of wealth to reallocate so early in the State's development. Instead, the
State pooled capital through starkly different means-not through taxation,
but conquest.
Under Connecticut's original 1662 charter, the State stretched westward in
a long strip through present-day Illinois.7' Over time Connecticut's claims to
these lands conflicted with those of New Yorkers and "Pennamites," or
residents of present-day Pennsylvania.' In 1782, a Court of Commissioners
appointed by the Continental Congress sided with the Pennamites, awarding
the Wyoming River Valley to Pennsylvania.' Apparently in recompense, when
Connecticut ceded its other western claims to the Continental government in
1785, it was allowed to keep approximately three million acres of its originally
chartered territory, the so-called Connecticut Western Reserve. 3 In 1795, the
68. See Database of Institutional Mortgages, supra note 52; see also supra Figures 3 & 4. The
Town of New Haven also made five loans during this period, but their average size was
barely $1oo and they are not discussed here.
69. But see NICHOLAS R. PARRLLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940, at 183-220 (2013) (describing tax ferrets, a non-
bureaucratic system of collecting taxes).
70. CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th century/cto3.asp
[http://perma.cc/RMB9-H 5A6] (granting Connecticut "all that Part of [King Charles II's]
Dominions in ...America ...to the South Sea on the West Part"). The "South Sea"
referred to the Pacific Ocean, although Charles II could only grant the land up to the
Mississippi River.
p. At various points, disputes over the lands boiled over into armed conflict, though the
"battles" of the Pennamite-Yankee War were far from spectacular. See Anne M. Ousterhout,
Frontier Vengeance: Connecticut Yankees vs. Pennamites in the Wyoming Valley, 62 PA. HIST. 330
(1995).
72. FREDERICK W. GNICHTEL, THE TRENTON DECREE OF 1782 AND THE PENNAMITE WAR
8-9 (1920), https://archive.org/stream/trentondecreeofloognic#page/8/mode/2up [http://
perma.cc/S5EU-2T2U].
7. Deed of Cession of Land from Connecticut to the United States (1786), http://www
.fold3.com/document/66o3899 [http://perma.cciBNT9-JK6P]; AMY DEROGATIs, MORAL
GEOGRAPHY: MAPS, MIssIONARIEs, AND THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 21 (2003).
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State sold the Connecticut Western Reserve for $1.2 million, a huge pool of
capital at the time, to a group of speculators operating as the Connecticut Land
Company. 4 However, at the time of sale, the State, the federal government,
and the settlers all lacked clear title to the Reserve. Native Americans remained
in possession of the bulk of the lands into the early nineteenth century. 75 The
Connecticut Land Company began to survey and divide the Western Reserve
into townships in 1796, ignoring Native claims in the process or buying out
some claims for vastly less than it paid Connecticut. 76 Native title may not have
been legally extinguished until the Treaty of Fort Industry in 1805, which was
the result of armed conflict.' From one perspective, then, Connecticut got the
money for its nineteenth-century mortgages in New Haven through theft, in
that it sold someone else's land and then allowed the buyers to violently drive
the original owners from the premises. However the (il)legal details of
Connecticut's land sale are described, this Note's Elite-Democratic terminology
for capital allocation is not much help. The State's methods of pooling capital
were too anomalous and geopolitically fraught to be called Elite or Democratic.
What of the State's dissemination of its pooled capital? At first blush, the
State's method of making loans appears sufficiently bureaucratic to support
Democratic lending. With the proceeds from its sale of the Western Reserve,
the State created the Connecticut School Fund, which made loans and
investments, including mortgages in cities like New Haven.78 By statute, "the
nett [sic] amount of interest, received yearly on said fund, [was] to be
74. See Claude L. Shephard, The Connecticut Land Company: A Study in the Beginnings of
Colonization of the Western Reserve, in THE CONNECTICUT LAND COMPANY AND
ACCOMPANYING PAPERS 71-72 (1916), https://archive.org/stream/connecticutlandcoowest
#page/72/mode/2up.
75. DEROGATIS, supra note 73, at 32-35 ("But despite the Connecticut Land Company's
assurance to would-be settlers that they had 'cleared' the land of indigenous peoples, their
continual presence was undeniable.").
76. Id. (describing the process of erasure of Native claims by European surveyors); Shephard,
supra note 74, at 74-75.
77. See Treaty with the Wyandot, July 4, 18o5, 7 Stat. 87, in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND
TREATIES 77-78 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904), http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler
/Vo12/treaties/wyaoo77.htm [http://perma.cc/PUC8-7JKC].
78. See HARRIET TAYLOR UPTON & HARRY GARDNER CUTLER, 1 HISTORY Or THE WESTERN
RESERVE 11 (1910). The School Fund is significant not only because it was an unusual
mechanism of public finance but also because of the State's active participation in the capital
markets. Essentially, to fund one of North America's earliest public school systems, the State
of Connecticut functioned as a relatively large bank, albeit one that, unlike other banks of
the period, could not issue currency. The Fund's existence also underscores one of the most
important facts of early American history: the States, although largely industrially
undeveloped by the end of the seventeenth century, were nonetheless wealthy in one crucial
respect - land.
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distributed, for the benefit of the public or common schools. "' In practice, the
School Fund operated as one of the nation's earliest administrative agencies."
It was headed by a Commissioner, who took the oath prescribed in the state
constitution for executive officers and was among the State's highest-paid
salaried officials.s The Commissioner apparently had real discretion, as the Act
that established his duties and responsibilities contained no specific guidance
from either the General Assembly or the governor regarding how loans and
investments were to be made.82 The Commissioner was, however, constrained
by a web of bureaucratic requirements, including registration of all the Fund's
investments and regular reporting to the state treasurer and comptroller."' The
administrative attributes of the School Fund suggest that it could have
operated as a modern Democratic financial intermediary, building out a
lending portfolio through expertise and institutional competence.84
Before 1837, however, this was not the case: the School Fund's borrowers
were of the same profile as the New Haven Bank's. The available evidence for
the School Fund's mortgagors is not as conclusive as the New Haven Bank's,
but along each of the aspects discussed in the context of the Bank's lending
79. See An Act Relating to the School-Fund, in Swift, supra note 43, at 405-07. Although the
schools statute also provided for a general tax as a source of school financing, it stated that
"whenever, in any year, the amount of interest arising from the school-fund, and to be
divided to the school societies, shall exceed sixty-two thousand dollars, the amount of such
excess shall, for said year, so far diminish the sum hereby appropriated, from the avails of
the state tax." Id. § 12. Thus, the Fund was legally the primary source of funding for
Connecticut's first public schools. The size of the School Fund's returns for this period are
unclear, so the Fund's interest may never have decreased the tax. However, it would have
taken only slightly more than a five percent return on the Fund's initial $1.2 million dollars
to clear sixty-two thousand dollars in interest. Accordingly, the Fund may have been the
primary source for school funding in practice as well as in theory.
8o. See WLLIAM J. NOvAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURYAMERICA 202 (1996). Novak has claimed that the "first real administrative agencies
in the United States" were state and local boards of health founded in Massachusetts, New
York, and Pennsylvania in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While the
School Fund Commissioner could not promulgate regulations to the extent of these boards,
the other administrative attributes of the office suggest the School Fund may also be a
contender for this distinction.
81. See An Act Relating to the School-Fund, in Swift, supra note 43, at 405; An Act for
Regulating Salaries and Fees 5 1, in Swift, supra note 43, at 387-88. The Commissioner was
paid $1,ooo a year from the Fund. It appears the only state officials paid more were the
governor, who was paid $1,ioo, and the justices of the Supreme Court of Errors, who were
paid $1,1oo (for the chiefjustice) and $1,oo (for each associate justice).
82. See An Act Relating to the School-Fund § i, in Swift, supra note 43, at 405.
83. Id. S 5-6.
84. Unlike other banks of the period, however, the School Fund did not issue currency.
Connecticut's Upper House voted down a proposal to charter a true Bank of the State of
Connecticut in 18o6. See HAssE, supra note 40, at 9-1o.
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except one, the State's borrowers appear just as patrician. While calculating a
rate of kinship relationships between individual borrowers and the State of
Connecticut would be incoherent, many of the State's pre-1837 borrowers are
identifiably elite. Among others, they included Seth Staples, a founder of Yale
Law School; James Hillhouse, a United States Senator; and James Brewster, a
leading business magnate.8 s In addition, the average size of the Fund's pre-1837
mortgages was $2,355 (compared to $2,358 for the New Haven Bank's),
suggesting that borrowers had considerable wealth.86 While the record does
not provide clear visibility on the purpose of these loans, several of them
appear to have been related to business activities. For instance, a John Calhoun
mortgaged his factory lands in 1834.87 While business activities do not
necessarily imply that a borrower was patrician, they suggest greater than
average economic and social clout among New Haveners of the period.
The only dimension along which the Fund's pre-1837 mortgages do not
align with the Bank's is the variety and sophistication of their terms. The
Fund's mortgages were standardized; all of them contained essentially identical
voiding clauses. These voiding clauses provided that interest would be paid
annually on September 2nd and that every mortgage became payable on the
September 2nd after it was made.88 These standardized components coincide
with the reporting requirements of the Fund's Commissioner under state
statute: the Commissioner was required to deposit duplicate copies of
accounting materials for the Fund in a vault in Hartford on September 2nd
every year.8' The bureaucratic origins of the loans, then, appear to have
affected their terms. In addition, all of the voiding clauses set out "penal sums"
for which the borrower would be liable if his loan was not satisfactorily
repaid.9" These penal sums were generally twice the principal of the mortgage.
There is little evidence that these harsh terms were enforced to their legal
extent.9" One likely explanation for their inclusion is that the State, or more
accurately the Fund's Commissioner, wanted to secure the maximum-possible
85. See Obituary, James Brewster of New-Haven, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1866,
http ://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9CoiE6D953DE63ABC4D5lDFB767838D
679FDE [http://perma.cc/S56-PPT8]; see, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 54, P. 315 of Land
Records (Oct. 31, 1805) (lending to Staples); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 76, p. 227 of Land
Records (Nov. 1o, 1828) (lending to Hillhouse); Mortgage Deed at Vol. 91, p. 11o of Land
Records (June 1, 1836) (lending to Brewster).
86. Database of Total Mortgages, supra note 29.
87. Mortgage Deed at Vol. 85, p. 145 of Land Records (May 30, 1834).
88. The Fund's mortgages were, accordingly, short-term. See supra note 56 for an explanation
of the short terms of antebellum loans.
8g. See An Act Relating to the School-Fund S 3, in Swift, supra note 43, at 405-o6.
go. See, e.g., Mortgage Deed, at Vol. 89, p. 54 of Land Records (Nov. 25, 1835).
gi. See supra note 56.
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legal protections when loaning out public money. Given their origins, the
standardized terms of the Fund's mortgages are not inconsistent with the
patrician borrower profile established by the loans' other attributes. Overall,
then, the School Fund appears to have located borrowers using the same pre-
existing social and economic networks as the New Haven Bank. Despite being
a public institution, the Fund loaned to the socioeconomic elite.
In sum, New Haven's mortgage market before 1837 was characterized by
large, often sophisticated loans to New Haven citizens with significant wealth
and social status. Institutional lenders operated as Elite lenders, relying on
insider networks to locate and evaluate borrowers. Even the State did not
behave as a Democratic lender in its pooling or dissemination of capital. The
next Part asks if this patrician mortgage market lasted and finds that it did not:
bank mortgages soon became accessible to a wide range of non-elite New
Haven residents.
III. MORTGAGE LENDING IN NEW HAVEN DURING AND AFTER 1837
This Part examines the New Haven mortgage market after 1837. It finds a
profoundly different landscape from the pre-1837 market considered in Part II.
In particular, after 1837, the most active bank, the New Haven Savings Bank,
made loans to a broad population of residents and does not appear to have
relied on pre-existing networks of wealth and social status to allocate its
capital. However, the New Haven Savings Bank was not the first institution to
lend outside of New Haven's elite. In 1837, the year before the Savings Bank
was chartered, the Town Deposit Fund, a local, public institution, made a
significant volume of loans to a wide range of people. Part III.A documents the
Town's lending activities and the mortgage market in 1837. Part III.B focuses
on the New Haven Savings Bank and how it continued the 1837 shift into the
184os and beyond. Based on the greater accessibility of the market and the
interactions of later institutions with borrowers, the shift in 1837 can be
characterized as a transition from Elite to Democratic capital allocation and
therefore as an important step in New Haven's financial development.
A. Mortgage Lending in New Haven in 1837: The Town Deposit Fund
1837 was a big year in the New Haven mortgage market.92 Private banks
made $37,100 in mortgage loans. These loans were typical of pre-1837 private
bank mortgages: there were only six of them, and their average size was $6,183.
However, in the same year, another institution made five times as many loans
92. See supra Figures 3 & 4.
124:158 2014
MORTGAGE LENDING IN NEW HAVEN
as any private lender had previously made in a single year. This lender was not
a bank, but the Town of New Haven itself. Because the Town abruptly made
such a large volume of loans, this section considers its funding sources and
lending activities in detail.
Like the State of Connecticut, the Town did not use taxation to accumulate
its capital but instead acquired a windfall through the sale of western lands.
However, the Town's windfall, and the seizure of Native American lands that
lay behind it, was filtered through several more layers of politics and history
than the State's. After the Eastern states ceded their western holdings to the
federal government, it began a long process of selling them to settlers and
speculators. By 1836, the federal government had accumulated a substantial
surplus through these sales.9" The question of what to do with the surplus
generated significant political controversy, until Congress decided to divide it
up and distribute it to the states.94
In an early commitment to state-local federalism, Connecticut continued to
divide and distribute the surplus funds downwards - into the hands of
Connecticut towns. In 1836, the Connecticut Legislature passed a statute
creating "[T]own [D]eposit [F] unds" in each Connecticut town that wished to
receive part of the surplus.95 These Funds were to make loans and investments,
and the profits they earned were to go, in part, towards funding local school
systems.96 When faced with another windfall from the sale of western lands,
Connecticut essentially created a set of miniature School Funds, each in its own
municipality. Like the School Fund, the Town Deposit Funds were examples of
active participation by early American government in the capital markets. This
time, however, all levels of government, including the federal and the local,
were involved: almost a century before the formation of Fannie Mae, the
federal government's money was already shaping the mortgage market in New
Haven.97 Like the State's pooling activities before 1837, then, the Town's
acquisition of capital to fund its 1837 mortgages cannot be considered Elite or
Democratic.
93. See EDWARD G. BOURNE, THE HISTORY OF THE SURPLUS REVENUE OF 1837; BEING AN
ACCOUNT OF ITS ORIGINS, ITS DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE STATES, AND THE USES TO WHICH
IT WAS APPLIED 12-20 (1885).
94. See An Act to Regulate the Deposites of the Public Money [sic], S Stat. 52 (1836); BOURNE,
supra note 93, at 21-26.
95. An Act Relating to Moneys Received from the Government of the United States ch. 2, in
THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 686-93 (Henry Dutton et al. eds., 1854).
Connecticut also required that the funds eventually be paid back and attached various
conditions to their disbursal. Id. S 7.
96. Id. § 17. Sections 17 and 18 of the Act authorize the towns to use any portion greater than
half for schools.
97. See National HousingAct Amendments of 1938, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012).
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The Town's dissemination of capital in 1837 appears to have been
significantly more Democratic than the State's earlier activities. The statute
creating the Town Deposit Funds also required towns to establish small
administrative agencies to manage them: "An agent or agents, appointed by
each town at an annual town meeting, or at a special town meeting warned for
that purpose, shall from time to time be the manager or managers of the fund
belonging to their respective towns, and shall at their discretion make loans
therefrom .... ,98 In practice, the State actually devolved the surplus funds two
levels down, skipping over mayors and existing local government structures to
give authority over the money directly to townspeople in public meetings.
While the Town Deposit Funds did not have the bureaucratic heft of the
Connecticut School Fund, they did have two hallmarks of modern
administrative agencies: discretion authorized by statute and additional
legitimacy arising from direct public input.
New Haven's Town Deposit Fund began making mortgages early in 1837. 9 9
Its loans, however, did not look like the pre-1837 bank or State mortgages.
First, there were a lot of them: thirty-five in 1837 alone, almost as many as the
New Haven Bank had made between 18oo and 1837 in total. Second, they were
small, averaging $814 (compared to $2,358 for the New Haven Bank and $2,355
for the State of Connecticut before 1837). None of the Town's mortgages
exceeded $1,ooo. Third, they were standardized, in part because the statute
creating the Town Deposit Funds regulated the mortgages they could make.
Every Town mortgage contained an essentially identical voiding clause,
making the loan payable on the upcoming September 28th and requiring
annual interest payments on September 28th, days before the October ist date
required by statute. 00 However, the Town does not appear to have taken full
advantage of these terms. I located release documents for nineteen of the Town
mortgages; the average period between issuance of the loan and recorded
release of obligations was seventy-nine months.'0 ' Finally, and most
98. An Act Relating to Moneys Received from the Government of the United States § 13, in
Dutton, supra note 95.
99. Mortgage Deed at Vol. 92, p. 472 of Land Records (Apr. 7, 1837).
1oo. An Act Relating to Moneys Received from the Government of the United States § 13, in
Dutton, supra note 95. The statute also required that each loan be secured by real estate
worth twice the value of the loan. Id.
1o1. See Database of Institutional Mortgages, supra note 52. See generally supra note 56 (providing
background on terms and renewal rates in antebellum lending markets). To locate the
release documents, I searched later archive indexes for deeds listing the Town of New
Haven as grantor and, by comparing names of grantees, amounts of mortgages, or dates,
was able to match release documents (usually quitclaim deeds) to original mortgages. These
data suggest that the Town did not always enforce the legal terms of its mortgages to the
fullest extent and, indeed, was quite lenient with renewals and repayment schedules.
However, this conclusion is tentative. It is possible that quitclaim deeds for some of the
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importantly, many of the borrowers from the Town Deposit Fund were
identifiably not patrician. Determining the social status of the mortgagors is
difficult, but New Haven began publishing a city-wide Directory in the early
184Os.' °2 Many of the Town's initial thirty-five borrowers are listed in the 1841
Directory, although not all. Appendix I provides the Directory information for
each borrower in full. The list includes several joiners (carpenters), a
blacksmith, a shoemaker, and other middle-class occupations. The list is not
universally middle class: a few manufacturers, a state senator, and a sheriff
appear. But the leading social and business lights of New Haven are not
present. The Town's loans went to a more diverse crowd with less wealth and
lower social standing.
It is not clear why the Town Deposit loans went to this group of people.
Several different economic explanations are possible. First, because the private
banks were also active in 1837, there may not have been patrician demand for
loans from the Fund. However, the first private bank mortgage that year was
not made until April 22, 1837, by which point the Town had already made
twenty mortgages. 1 3 Second, 1837 was a tough year economically: the Panic of
1837 began in the spring and plunged the nation into a severe depression.0 4
The Town Deposit Fund may have been providing some financial relief to New
Haven townspeople. Buried within this second economic explanation, though,
is a political one: the idea that the Fund would help out average townspeople
implies that they had some way to translate their economic hardships into
action by the Fund. The statute that created the Fund supplied such a
mechanism: the people of New Haven controlled the Fund through an agent
they appointed at a town meeting. Regardless of the wider economic
circumstances, then, the best account of why the Fund began lending to
ordinary folks may be simply that state law put them in charge of the money.
This would have been a profoundly Democratic means of disseminating
capital, in that it would have set aside pre-existing social networks entirely and
used a structured forum to assimilate information from and about strangers.
The mortgage lending activities of the Town Deposit Fund did not last
long. After 1837, the Town made only seven more mortgages, although they
mortgages were recorded much later than when an associated loan was repaid: mortgagors
may have needed to demonstrate clear title for a later sale and requested that the bank record
release documentation. This would explain why release documents were recorded for only
some mortgages. Promissory notes would provide better evidence of repayment practices.
However, very few promissory notes from the period survive.
ioa. See CITY DIRECTORY OF NEW HAVEN (2d ed. 1841) (on file with the New Haven Museum).
103. Mortgage Deed at Vol. 92, p. 495 of Land Records (Apr. 11, 1837); Database of Total
Mortgages, supra note 29 (on file with author).
104. See Peter L. Rousseau, Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837, 62 J.
ECON. HIST. 457 (2002).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
were typical of the 1837 loans in their size, terms, and the identities of the
borrowers. The withdrawal of the Town from the market is not mysterious:
the surplus funds were limited and, under the Connecticut and federal statutes,
eventually had to be repaid. However, although the particular lending activities
of the Town did not continue, the practice of making small, standardized loans
to a socioeconomically diverse range of residents in New Haven did. A private
bank founded in 1838 would carry these practices forward into the 184os and
beyond. The following section examines the rise of this institution, the New
Haven Savings Bank, in detail.
B. Mortgage Lending After 1837: The Rise of the New Haven Savings Bank
Institutional mortgage lending after 1837 is primarily a story of the New
Haven Savings Bank. In every year after it was founded in 1838, until at least
1845, it made a greater number of mortgage loans and lent more in total than
all other private banks in New Haven combined. Indeed, the other banks
largely abandoned the mortgage market after 1837, making only five more
loans through the end of 1844. In that time, the New Haven Savings Bank
made 169 mortgages, rapidly establishing itself as a force in the New Haven
mortgage market. This section explores the origins and practices of the New
Haven Savings Bank and concludes that it was the city's first genuinely
Democratic financial intermediary, one that primarily relied on expertise and
institutional competence instead of pre-existing social and economic networks
to pool and allocate capital.
Unlike most other private institutional mortgage lenders in New Haven,
the New Haven Savings Bank was a mutual savings bank rather than a full-
service bank. In practice, this distinction boils down to two key differences.
First, the New Haven Savings Bank did not issue currency like other banks of
the period. A national currency would not emerge until the 186os, and a key
function of banks in the early nineteenth century was to provide paper
money.05 The second and more important difference is that the New Haven
Savings Bank pooled capital primarily through deposits instead of sales of bank
stock. o 6 This meant that the bank pooled capital from a much broader and
socioeconomically diverse set of private wealth holders than other banks. Recall
that, under its Act of Incorporation, a share of New Haven Bank stock cost
$200- more than many of the individual mortgages issued by the New Haven
105. For the Act creating a national currency, see the National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99
(1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012)).
1o6. LAMOREAuX, supra note 12, at 70. For a discussion of deposit-taking in nineteenth-century
New England and "[d]irectors' preference for stock issues over deposits," see id. at 65-70.
124:iS8 2014
MORTGAGE LENDING IN NEW HAVEN
Savings Bank. 1°7 In contrast, the New Haven Savings Bank took any deposit of
one dollar or greater,s Indeed, the Savings Bank's cheerful yellow passbooks
from the period, in which account holders recorded deposits and dividend
payments, were explicitly targeted towards upwardly mobile depositors who
had dreams of acquiring wealth but were not there yet. Adorned with a large
image of a beehive, a symbol of industry, the passbooks contained a Remarks
section explaining that
[The New Haven Savings Bank] has been established for the purpose
of affording a secure investment to persons who have not the facilities
of safely putting their income otherwise to use.
• . . By the habit of saving in small matters, riches are frequently
acquired. . . . Many instances are known of persons beginning the
world without anything, who have become rich by their own industry
and frugality.
The Savings Bank will be particularly useful to ... persons who come
in possession of money received by way of wages, gifts, or
gratuities ... .09
Materials like the Savings Bank's passbooks are quintessential attributes of
Democratic financial intermediaries. The Savings Bank did not accumulate
capital through existing social and kinship networks, bundling together the
wealth of high-status individuals who already knew each other. Instead, the
Savings Bank targeted essentially anonymous people and convinced them to
part with their money by advertising its institutional competence and expertise.
These Democratic strategies appear to have been effective. Founded in May
1838, the Bank had collected $6,559.11 in deposits by October 1838.1' By 1840,
107. See An Act to Incorporate the New-Haven Bank, in Swift, supra note 43, at 69; see also supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
1os. Bylaws of the New Haven Savings Bank art. 8, in Depositor's Bank Book with the New
Haven Savings Bank 4, on file with the New Haven Historical Society, Manuscript File #76,
Box i, Folder K [hereinafter New Haven Savings Bank Passbook]. The inside cover of the
passbook is reproduced in infra Appendix II.
iog. Remarks, in New Haven Savings Bank Passbook, supra note io8, at 5-7.
no. Letter from William G. Hooker, Treasurer, New Haven Say. Bank, to Henry Kilbourn,
Comptroller of Pub. Accounts for the State of Conn. (Oct. 9, 1838) (on file with the New
Haven Historical Society, Manuscript File No. 76, Box 1, Folder K).
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less than two years into its existence, the Savings Bank had 6oo depositors in a
town of around 14,000 people.1
It would be tempting to settle on the deposit structure of the Savings
Bank as the reason it made loans to a more socioeconomically diverse set of
borrowers. From this perspective, the whole shift in New Haven's mortgage
market could be reduced to an innovation in capital pooling that subsequently
opened the institutional lending market to a new class of mortgagors.
However, there is a glaring counterexample to this theory. The New Haven
Savings Bank was not actually the first primarily deposit-taking, mutual
savings bank in New Haven: the earlier and confusingly similarly named
Saving Bank of New Haven (SBNH) was chartered in 182o. The SBNH pooled
capital and functioned more or less identically to the later New Haven Savings
Bank-all the way down to the colorful passbooks, although the SBNH's were
pink and had a reassuring quote from Benjamin Franklin on their cover instead
of a beehive.1 2 The SBNH was also successful at attracting depositors," 3
acquiring over one thousand by the mid-1820s. 1 4 Although it accumulated
capital from a socially diverse range of individuals in New Haven, the SBNH
did not lend to a wide range of them. It appears to have made only one
recorded mortgage during its existence."' Most of the SBNH's capital went
into the Eagle Bank, New Haven's second bank, founded in 1811.16 The Eagle
Bank seems to have been fully of the patrician mold of the New Haven Bank,
although much less successful." 7 It failed in 1825, "giving New Haven its first
mn. See HASSE, supra note 40, at 30.
112. Compare, e.g., New Haven Savings Bank Passbook, supra note iO8, with, e.g., The Saving
Bank of New Haven, Passbook No. ioio, belonging to Peter Apple, Inside Front Cover,
New Haven Museum, Manuscript File #76 Box i, Folder L [hereinafter Passbook No. lOl].
The front cover of an SBNH passbook is included in Appendix B, infra.
113. HASSE, supra note 40, at 17 (quoting from minutes of SBNH meeting that "255 persons in io
months have made 401 deposits in the amount of $23,199").
114. Passbook No. olo, supra note 112. The New Haven Museum has passbooks for a significant
number of SBNH depositors on file.
115. See Mortgage Deed at Vol. 76, p. 136 of Land Records (Jan. 29, 1828).
116. See HASSE, supra note 40, at lo, 16-17. The two institutions shared Presidents. For more
background, see generally the facts of Savings Bank of New-Haven v. Bates, 8 Conn. 504
(1831); Savings Bank of New Haven v. Davis, 8 Conn. 191 (1830); Catlin v. Savings Bank of
New-Haven, 7 Conn. 487 (1829); and Homer v. Savings Bank ofNew-Haven, 7 Conn. 478
(1829). All of these cases concerned the affairs of the Eagle Bank, but the SBNH was the
captioned party in them.
117. Its president was elected mayor in 1822, in the middle of an era where patrician professionals
controlled the office. See DqmU, supra note 53, at 12 tbl.2.1. In addition, an accounting of the
Eagle Bank's holdings on its demise shows that it operated as a typical bank during the
period. See Report of Investigators of Eagle Bank (Oct. 25, 1825) (on file with the New
Haven Museum, Manuscript File #76, Box i, Folder C).
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real financial panic" and dragging the SBNH down with it."8 The SBNH
officially shut its doors in 1825 but managed to pay back its depositors, with
modest interest, by 1832.19 The unhappy details of New Haven's first bank
crisis are largely beside the point here. The lesson of the SBNH is that
accumulating deposits from a wide range of individuals did not imply that a
bank would lend to these individuals or that it would be beyond the control of
the financial elite.='
The later New Haven Savings Bank was no exception to this latter point.
Although it accepted deposits from a socioeconomically diverse set of people, it
remained firmly under the control of New Haven's elite. As of 1841, it had a
President, four Vice Presidents, and nine Trustees.121 Of these fourteen men,
half either served on the Board of the New Haven Bank or shared a last name
with someone who did. Of the remaining seven, four had borrowed money
from the New Haven Bank at some point before 1837, including James
Brewster, one of New Haven's earliest industrial magnates. The final three
included Ralph Ingersoll, a United States Congressman, and Roger Sherman,
likely the son of the more-famous Roger Sherman, a Founding Father and
New Haven's first mayor. The only Trustee that did not have easily identifiable
patrician bona fides was Henry White. But given his compatriots among the
Savings Bank's management, it is doubtful he was, in the words of the Savings
Bank's passbooks, a "person[] [who] beg[an] the world without anything."'
In addition, the New Haven Savings Bank was housed for many years "in a
room in the rear of the New Haven Bank building," which in 1839 at least, it
was allowed to use rent-free. 23 For a time, the Board of the Savings Bank
conducted meetings in the New Haven Bank's boardroom.'14 Although its
capital may have come from outside elite circles, the New Haven Savings Bank
was still managed by the city's patrician leaders.
But the New Haven Savings Bank differed from its predecessors in the
volume and socioeconomic composition of its borrowers. Unlike earlier private
118. See HASSE, supra note 40, at 13, 17.
119. Id. at 17. Hasse reports that depositors received $i.m for every dollar deposited by the end of
1832. My own calculations based on the passbooks on file with the New Haven Museum put
the number closer to $1.20.
1ao. For a case study of two mutual savings banks that puts the experience of the SBNH and the
New Haven Savings Bank into perspective, see Lance Edwin Davis and Peter Lester Payne,
From Benevolence to Business: The Story of Two Savings Banks, 32 Bus. HIST. REV. 386, 398
tbl.3 (1958).
121. See CITY DIREcToRY OF NEW HAVEN, supra note 102.
122. See Remarks, supra note 109.
123. HASSE, supra note 40, at 29-30. Rent for the following year was set at seventy-five dollars.
Id. at 30.
124. Id.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
banks in New Haven and even the SBNH, the New Haven Savings Bank lent
to a broad population of residents. Moreover, its lending practices indicate that
it relied on expertise and institutional competence to locate and evaluate
borrowers, operating as a Democratic financial intermediary. First, the sheer
volume of mortgages originated by the Savings Bank would have strained
reliance on pre-existing social and economic networks in New Haven. In 1844
alone, the Savings Bank made sixty mortgages, an order of magnitude more
than any other private bank in a single year. The upward trend in the volume
of the Bank's mortgages appears to have continued and accelerated in later
years. In 1847, a few years outside the window of this Note's datasets, the Land
Records began to accept printed form pages specifically for mortgages
originated by the Savings Bank, ostensibly because their volume was so
large.125 Second, in keeping with developments like printed forms and unlike
other bank lenders, the Savings Bank's mortgages were standardized, including
essentially identical voiding clauses setting semiannual interest payments and
making mortgages payable "on demand, for value received. "126 Unlike the
125. See Vol. 124 in Land Records; see, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 124, p. 1 of Land Records (Oct.
15, 1847) (included in Appendix B). These printed forms were used at least until 1891. See
Marshall, supra note 30, at 93, App. A.
126. See, e.g., Mortgage Deed at Vol. 105, p. 69 of Land Records (Oct. 4, 1841). Some of the
Bank's early loans in 1838 deviated from this language, and there are exceptions in the
record even in later years. For the most part, though, the language of the Savings Bank's
mortgage deeds remained constant. The payability-on-demand term is puzzling. Taken at
face value, it would give the Savings Bank the power to demand repayment of a loan at any
time. Even given the short-term nature of many of the loans from this period, such a
provision would be extreme. See supra note 56. In practice, it appears that loans were paid
back over a period of years. Using the archives' indexes, I searched for deeds where the Bank
was listed as a grantee. I located thirty-one release documents, generally quitclaim deeds,
recorded before 1844 explicitly releasing mortgagors from obligations to the Bank and
renouncing Bank claims to mortgaged land. As with the release documents for the Town
mortgages, I matched these releases with earlier Bank mortgages using the name of the
grantee, the date of the original mortgage (if given in the release), or the volume and page
number of the original mortgage (in some cases this was included in the release document).
The average length of time between the initial mortgage deed and the associated release was
twenty-six months, implying that, in many cases, the Bank did not demand repayment of
loans as early as it might have. However, release documents may not be valid indications of
when loans were repaid. See supra note ioi for a fuller discussion of these issues. It is also
possible that the language "payable on demand for value received" incorporated more
lenient repayment terms contained in the promissory note associated with each mortgage.
However, a surviving promissory note from this period contains no such extra terms and
instead repeats the same provision: "On demand, for value received, I promise to pay the
New Haven Savings Bank, at the office of said Bank, in the city of New Haven, the sum of
Two Thousand Dollars, with the interest payable semiannually." Promissory Note, supra
note 56 (noting, on the reverse side, that principal repayments did not begin for eight
years). The legal and economic significance of the payability-on-demand terms is discussed
in greater depth in Part IV.B.
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Town and the State, the Savings Bank was not constrained by statutory
demands in standardizing the terms of its loans. Accordingly, the consistency
of the voiding clause language across a large volume of mortgages suggests that
the Bank sold a standardized product, perhaps familiar to its customers over
time, and did not engage in extensive bargaining with sophisticated
mortgagees. Third, the Savings Bank's mortgages were small-$i,ioo on
average, less than half the size of those made by earlier banks. The smaller size
of the mortgages suggests that they were made to less-wealthy borrowers, who
were less likely to be plugged into patrician social networks. Finally, many of
the Savings Bank's borrowers were identifiably not members of New Haven's
elite, based on their occupations as given in the annual city directories. Because
so many mortgagors are unlisted in the directories, they do not provide a
complete picture of the socioeconomic composition of the Savings Bank's
borrowers. However, they do confirm that the borrowers included joiners,
painters, grocers, an African-American laborer, and various other middle-class
folks. 7 There were upper-class, professional borrowers as well: a physician,
whom the directories also identify as an "instructor in elocution," and a
lawyer2 8 By the early 184Os, however, the Savings Bank was making more
loans every year to carpenters and blacksmiths than the New Haven Bank
made in a single year to all of its borrowers.
The composition of the Bank's borrowers, the details of its mortgages, and
the way it presented itself through materials like its passbooks all show that the
Savings Bank operated as a genuine Democratic financial intermediary. Unlike
the earlier banks that accumulated capital and made loans primarily within elite
social networks, the Savings Bank had the expertise and institutional
capabilities to reach beyond existing social structures, attract capital from
strangers, and allocate capital to strangers. Moreover, operating in this way
was profitable for the Savings Bank: it grew in size, was still a force in New
Haven's mortgage market in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, 2 9 and remained in business into the early 200os before undergoing a
successful merger.'30 Its shift into Democratic lending was a permanent change
in the city's financial development.
This Part has examined the 1837 shift in New Haven's mortgage market.
During and after 1837, mortgages from institutions became broadly accessible
to residents of the city who were not among its elite. A relatively small number
were able to acquire mortgages from the Town Deposit Fund in 1837, and,
soon thereafter, a greater number took out mortgages from the New Haven
127. See CmrY DIRECTORY OF NEW HAVEN, supra note 102.
128. Id.
129. See Marshall, supra note 30.
13o. See Merger Decisions, supra note 31.
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Savings Bank. While the Town Deposit Fund may not have acquired its capital
in a Democratic fashion, it at least operated like a Democratic institution in that
it relied on its institutional capabilities to find borrowers instead of pre-
existing social networks. The New Haven Savings Bank was the city's first true
Democratic financial intermediary: pooling as well as disseminating capital
outside of pre-existing social structures. However, this discussion of the
change in the city's mortgage market has not addressed a central question-
and a particularly salient one if any modern lessons are to be drawn from New
Haven's nineteenth-century experience: why did this change occur? Why did
the city shift from Elite to Democratic capital allocation in 1837? The next and
final Part proposes some answers to this question.
IV. WHY DID THE SHIFT IN NEW HAVEN'S MORTGAGE MARKET
OCCUR?
This Part considers why New Haven's mortgage market shifted from Elite
to Democratic capital allocation when it did. Understanding what drove the
changes in the market could provide valuable insights into how to promote
financial development and economic democratization in settings besides early
nineteenth-century New Haven. The following sections consider, in turn,




Macroeconomic conditions may have played a role in the shift in the New
Haven mortgage market. The early nineteenth century was a period of amazing
growth. Between 18oo and 185o, the city's population more than tripled, and
the number of houses quadrupled. 3' One account of the shift in the city's
mortgage market might be that it was primarily a product of this economic
growth. However, this is too thin an account to fully explain the change. First,
New Haven's economic development during this period unfolded over
decades, but the shift in the mortgage market happened abruptly. Moreover,
the particular moment when the change began was an exception to the long-
term pattern of growth: the Panic of 1837 was among the most severe in
American history and began a recession lasting through the mid-184os.'32 Bank
131. See NEW HAVEN CITY REPORTS (i86o-i861) (on file with the New Haven Museum).
13. See Rousseau, supra note 104, at 457.
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failures and loan losses were widespread.133 More locally, the New Haven Bank,
along with a consortium of New York City banks, suspended specie payments
for a year in 1837-1838.134 The late 183os and early 184os would be a
counterintuitive time for macroeconomic conditions to spur financial
development. A second problem with a purely macroeconomic account of the
shift is that empirical research suggests that the causal process generally runs
the other way, with financial development supporting economic growth.135 The
city's growth, particularly after 1837, was more likely a consequence of greater
institutional lending instead of a cause. Moreover, economic research has
documented situations in which significantly higher levels of economic
development and complexity than those present in 183os New Haven
nonetheless did not lead to a shift from Elite to Democratic capital allocation.
136
In sum, while the general trend of economic expansion in the nineteenth
century may have contributed to the city's financial development, it does not
sufficiently explain the discrete shift in the market.
2. Microeconomic Theories
A microeconomic perspective may do a better job of explaining the shift. A
microeconomic account would argue that the New Haven Savings Bank
appeared when it did because, with its passbooks and form mortgages, it was
able to lower the transaction and information costs of making mortgages in
New Haven, capture some of this cost reduction, and thereby sustain itself as
an institution. However, in order for this simple microeconomic story to
explain the sudden rise of Democratic lending after 1837, the relative costs of
Elite and Democratic lending must have changed abruptly. This defect is
particularly striking because there were other active financial institutions in
existence before 1837 that could have operated as Democratic intermediaries.
New firms must pay upfront costs to form and become active in a market. If
lower costs for lending by firms fully explained the appearance of Democratic
133. Id.
134. Id.; Theodore S. Woolsey, The Old New Haven Bank, in 8 PAPERS OF TiAE NEw HAVEN HIST.
SOC'y 310, 326-27 (1914); Record Book, supra note 45. Banknotes at the time were backed by
'specie," usually gold or silver, which holders could demand from any bank honoring the
notes.
135. See supra note i.
136. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Related Lending, 118 QJ. ECON. 231, 233 (2003) (documenting
the prevalence of "related lending," similar to insider lending, in modem Mexico and listing
twenty-four other countries where banks are controlled by "persons or entities with
substantial nonfinancial interests"); Edmund J. Malesky & Markus Taussig, Where is Credit
Due? Legal Institutions, Connections, and the Efficiency of Bank Lending in Vietnam, 25 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 535 (2009) (documenting "connected" lending in Vietnam).
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lending, then some existing firm, likely the New Haven Bank, should have
shifted into broader mortgage lending practices over time to maximize profits.
This is not a fatal flaw of the microeconomic account, but it does lead to a
correlative question: what changed in 1837 that sufficiently shifted the
economic calculations for institutional lending to justify the formation of a new
firm and a novel project of providing small bank loans to a diverse group of
borrowers?
B. Possible Legal Changes in Incorporation and Contracting
Legal developments can bring about changed economic circumstances.
They are particularly important to consider in the development context because
they point to discrete reforms that jurisdictions might make to promote
development. This section considers two types of legal developments that
could have changed the economic calculations behind Democratic lending in
New Haven in the 183os. However, legal changes do not seem to be the source
of the changed circumstances driving the rise of Democratic lending. In
particular, there do not seem to be relevant, specific changes that occurred
before the shift.
First, changes in incorporation laws could have lowered the costs associated
with forming a Democratic intermediary. This would place New Haven in line
with New York State and its turn to free banking laws in 1838, which reduced
the legal barriers to entering New York's banking market.'3 7 However,
Connecticut did not embrace free banking. Indeed, in 1838, it added to the
statute setting out the procedural steps necessary to petition the General
Assembly for a bank charter.' Moreover, although Connecticut had these
process requirements on its books, Connecticut and the rest of New England
had established a de facto free banking system early in the 181os and 182os,
essentially granting bank charters to all petitioners who followed the statutory
procedures. 3 9 There simply were no developments in incorporation laws that
would have lowered the entry costs for a new Democratic financial
intermediary in the late 183Os.
Second, changes in contract or real property law may have precipitated the
shift in the mortgage market. In particular, the standardized terms of the New
Haven Savings Bank's mortgages may have included some drafting innovation
137. See BODENHORN, supra note lo, at 183-218.
138. An Act in Addition to an Act Entitled "An Act Concerning Petitions and Memorials to the
General Assembly," 1839 Conn. Pub. Acts 326.
139. See BODENHORN, supra note io, at 78; Wallis, Answering Mary Shirley's Question, supra note
6, at ill ("[New England states] had established de facto free entry in banking in the 18ios
and 182os.").
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or term previously disallowed by law that substantially lowered its costs. The
most likely such term would have been the provision making its loans "payable
on demand." Particularly given Connecticut's usury laws, which capped
interest rates at six percent, it may have been valuable to make loans
immediately payable on demand. 4° However, there do not seem to have been
observable, relevant changes in property or contract law during this period.
Mortgages with "payable on demand" provisions were made between private
individuals and recognized by courts many years before 1837. ' Connecticut's
mortgage case law at the time seemed primarily concerned with notice-giving
requirements and priority issues, not with adjustments that might have
accommodated new institutional lenders. 42
Moreover, the available evidence suggests that the "payable on demand"
provisions of the Savings Bank's mortgages were not consistently enforced. It
is difficult to draw firm conclusions on this point because the Land Records
contain release documents for only a portion of the Bank's mortgage deeds. 43
However, at least thirty-one deeds explicitly releasing mortgagors from
obligations to the Bank and renouncing Bank claims to mortgaged land were
recorded before 1844."44 The length of time between an initial mortgage deed
and a release varied considerably but averaged twenty-six months. 4'
Therefore, for at least a non-trivial portion of its mortgages, the Bank appears
to have allowed its mortgagors some flexibility in the practical terms of their
loans. 16 This is not to say that the Bank never foreclosed on its mortgagors. 47
However, when it did foreclose, it had to follow the same foreclosure
procedures as any other lender: a deed of sale recorded in 1841 relates how the
140. See BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING, supra note 11, at 147 tbl.4.5 . If lenders cannot raise
interest rates to fully compensate themselves for risk because of usury laws, one way to
counteract such pro-debtor constraints is to structure repayment obligations to be as pro-
creditor as possible for instance, by making loans payable at any time upon demand by the
creditor.
141. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Wheaton, 9 Conn. 96 (1831) (refusing to admit parol evidence to
correct a promissory note that the parties may have intended to be payable on demand on
the lender's death).
142. See, e.g., Sanford v. Wheeler, 13 Conn. 164 (1839); Hubbard v. Savage, 8 Conn. 215 (1830);
Stoughton v. Pasco, s Conn. 442 (1825).
143. See supra notes iol and 126. As discussed in note loi, release documents may not be a good
indication of repayment periods.
144. See supra note 126.
145. Id.
146. But see supra note iol (explaining why deeds releasing mortgagor from obligations may have
been recorded later than repayment of associated loans).
147. See, e.g., Deed of Sale at Vol. 104 of Land Records, p. 178 (noting that the bank had
previously foreclosed on the property at issue).
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Bank sought a foreclosure decree for the land in question and waited for the
duration of a redemption period before taking title.148 Overall, then, the legal
details and context of the Bank's operations offer little explanation for why it
appeared when it did. Explanatory shifts in corporation, contracting, or real
property law are not apparent.
C. The Town and the Bank: A Sociopolitical Story
Although legal changes do not appear to have caused the shift in the
market, one statutory development had a direct effect on institutional lending
in New Haven: the creation of the Town Deposit Fund. The proximity of the
activities of the New Haven Town Deposit Fund to the rise of the New Haven
Savings Bank suggests a final theory for the shift in the mortgage market. This
theory takes the microeconomic account of the formation of Democratic
financial intermediaries as given and accepts that the Savings Bank formed and
was successful because it had lower marginal costs of pooling capital, locating
and evaluating mortgagees, and spreading risk. But before 1837, the relative
efficiency of a Democratic institution like the Savings Bank might not have
been known to the banks operating in the city. Although smaller mortgages to
non-elite individuals during this period may have been profitable - as
suggested by the existence of mortgages between individuals and the later
success of the New Haven Savings Bank- patrician banks may not have made
such mortgages because they gathered information through closed, elite
networks that had no way of assembling this knowledge. Without any
institution compiling the knowledge of profitability in a single place, it must
have been dispersed across a volume of individual-to-individual loans
throughout the city, many of them between individuals with whom the
patrician banks probably did not communicate. The very tools used by the
Elite banks to evaluate borrowers - pre-existing social status and wealth -
made them institutionally blind to downmarket opportunities.
The reason the market shifted in 1837, then, may be because the Town
solved this information problem by demonstrating the demand for and
viability of Democratic lending. The Connecticut statute disbursing the federal
surplus called for town meetings to appoint a manager for each Town Deposit
Fund. The manager's appointment and his work were subject to the
deliberative will of the community. It is possible, then, that the Town
148. Id. ("IS]aid land and buildings hereby conveyed are the same premises which were
mortgaged to the said New Haven Savings Bank. .. by deed dated July ith 1839 and on
which said New Haven Savings Bank obtained a decree of foreclosure from the Superior
Court for the County of New Haven at its term for January 1841 ... and the time limited by
said Court for the redemption of said premises by all said parties has expired.").
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overcame the information barrier in the market simply by asking townspeople
what they wanted to use the influx of capital for and then following their
instructions. By creating a political forum where economic actors who were not
plugged into pre-existing elite social networks could present and assemble
privately held knowledge in a public setting, the Town performed an
information-aggregating service with economically significant results. From
this perspective, the Town's intervention can be seen as an anti-Hayekian
moment, when economic information was too atomized to be useful until the
Town made it legible through a public forum and subsequent public action."
This information-aggregating theory must be accompanied by several
qualifications. First, there is a lack of direct evidence shedding light on the
town meetings creating the Deposit Fund or on the Fund's activities in
selecting borrowers. The New Haven Clerk's Office contains extensive
handwritten notes from several of New Haven's municipal government bodies
at the time, including the City's Board of Aldermen and Court of Common
Council. However, the archives of the Town's governing body, the Board of
Selectmen, are missing volumes covering several early decades of the
nineteenth century.' In particular, no record of the Town's political decision-
making in 1837 appears to exist. While the absence of this evidence is not a
direct counterargument to the sociopolitical account of the 1837 shift, it does
indicate how much weight such a theory places on the simple proximity of the
Town Deposit Fund to the formation of the New Haven Savings Bank.
Without direct evidence that townspeople had real input into the creation and
activities of the Town Deposit Fund, the link between the Fund and the wider
changes in the market must remain speculative.
A related and more substantive criticism of the sociopolitical account would
push back on the idea that demand for downmarket mortgages was so
atomized that private lenders could not put the information to use on their
own, without the intervention of a government-backed Town Deposit Fund.
Individual lenders were ostensibly profiting on their mortgages to individual
borrowers. What if they came together to create an institutional lender to
capture more of these profits? While this critique makes sense in terms of the
theoretical incentives of the relevant economic actors, it suffers from a few
defects. First, like a pure microeconomic theory explaining the New Haven
Savings Bank as a more efficient mortgage lender, a story of spontaneous
149. Cf F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (extolling the
powers of the price mechanism, rather than a central planning authority, to communicate
knowledge about local conditions).
150. Records exist for meetings of the Board of Selectmen from 1771 to 1819 and again from 1863
onwards. It is an unfortunate coincidence that the Town Deposit Fund was administered
during a period for which the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Selectmen are
unavailable.
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organization by individual lenders in New Haven begs the question of why the
Bank appeared when it did. Individual mortgage lenders had been profitably
making mortgage loans in New Haven for many years before the late 183os;
what would move them to act on their knowledge and form a bank in the teeth
of a bitter depression? Second, the counterexample of existing private lenders
coming together to create an institutional lender does not line up with the
historical record. The New Haven Savings Bank was founded and operated by
members of the patrician elite who were likely socially disconnected from at
least a significant portion of the individual borrowers and lenders in the city.
The Bank's formation was not the result of bottom-up economic knowledge
and financial incentives guiding the efforts of entrepreneurs. The Bank was
created because something caught the attention of the primary holders of social
and economic capital in New Haven and convinced them that it was time to
deploy their capital downwards. The innovative lending practices of the Town
Deposit Fund may seem far-fetched as a source of inspiration for the likes of
James Brewster and Ralph Ingersoll, but particularly in the absence of
alternatives, they are a plausible catalyst.
A final qualification of the sociopolitical account is simply that it is
incomplete. The theory cannot stand on its own. The Town may have served as
an information gate, providing a public forum for aggregating information and
demonstrating its accuracy through profitable loans. But this would have
counted for little if the wider economic conditions in New Haven had not been
conducive to a Democratic shift or if the New Haven Savings Bank had been
legally or organizationally incapable of capitalizing on the information. Most
importantly, the activities of the Fund alone would probably not have shifted
the lending practices of the patrician leaders of the New Haven Savings Bank if
they had not been already prepared for some change. The background
sociopolitical dynamics in New Haven must have played an important role. In
particular, the sociopolitical account rests on the assumption that a town
meeting could adequately assemble dispersed community knowledge of
profitable downmarket demand for credit. If patricians had totally dominated
the town's political scene, then the relevant information about the lower
segment of the mortgage market might not have been heard. However, the
assumption that the town's political institutions allowed middle-class voices to
be heard- particularly upwardly mobile middle-class voices asking for
mortgages -is not unreasonable. At the time, New Haven was on the cusp of
significant social change. Economic and social leadership was slowly shifting
from the patrician elite to a new group of more self-made strivers. Robert Dahl
identifies the election of P.S. Galpin in 1842 as the moment when political
leadership shifted between these two groups.' If the Young Turks of New
5l1. See DAHL, supra note 117, at 13 tbl.2.1.
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Haven could capture the mayor's office in 1842, then they may very well have
been able to influence the creation and activities of the Town Deposit Fund five
years earlier.
Alongside the broader social changes taking place in the city, the statute
creating the Town Deposit Fund also deserves credit for ensuring that citizens
outside the patrician elite had some say in how the federal surplus funds were
ultimately allocated. Had the statute simply placed the Fund under the control
of the New Haven mayor in 1837, H.C. Flagg, a patrician lawyer, then the Fund
might not have been able to serve the same information-aggregating
purpose." 2 Accordingly, the statute can be seen as an early and successful
example of federalism-all-the-way-down through its empowerment of a local
population that had not yet won outright political control of the city.5 3 From
this perspective, the sociopolitical account offers some policy guidance for
modern governments seeking to promote financial development. In particular,
it suggests that modern governments might embrace robustly decentralized
models of economic action to solve information gaps in local markets. It also
highlights how unregulated local markets may have particular information
problems that require public action. But the sociopolitical account does not call
for sustained or large-scale government intervention in markets. Instead, it
recommends government action on a local scale to assemble information that
would otherwise be too diffuse or buried in the community to be economically
useful. The real lesson of the shift in New Haven's mortgage market may be
the value of small-scale legibility produced by local political structures." 4
Overall, the sociopolitical account has strengths and weaknesses and is
likely only a partial explanation for the changes in the city's mortgage market.
However, this theory may be testable. The statute creating the Town Deposit
Fund authorized and financed similar Funds in municipalities across
Connecticut. These towns, like New Haven, kept land records. It would be
possible to recreate the methodology of this Note in other cities, such as
Hartford and Bridgeport. If the federal surplus funds were distributed in
similar ways in other municipalities, then further research could determine if
similar shifts occurred in other local mortgage markets. Moreover, cities in
other New England states like Rhode Island and Massachusetts could be
included in the sample. Lamoreaux and Bodenhorn have documented extensive
152. Id. at 12 tbl.2.1.
153. Cf Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARv. L. REV. 4, 23-25 (2010) (identifying local institutions as potential "sites for
pursuing federalism's values").
154. For an extended discussion of how governments produce legibility (and the negative
consequences that can result), see generally JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How
CERTAIN ScHEMEs To IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998).
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similarities among the nineteenth-century financial systems of these states. s5
But each state did not spend its share of the federal surplus in the same way.
The financial markets of towns with active Deposit Funds could be compared
with the outcomes of towns in neighboring states that lacked Deposit Funds.
Further research along these lines could provide more compelling evidence that
the Town Deposit Fund played a significant role in New Haven's development
and could yield further recommendations for modern policy approaches.
CONCLUSION
This Note has taken a detailed look at New Haven's transition from Elite to
Democratic financial intermediation. It has no illusions that the experience of a
mid-sized Connecticut city in the early nineteenth century is comprehensively
representative of economic development in other times and places. However,
the city's mortgage market did undergo a change in the late 183os that is crucial
for complex, sustained economic growth -namely the transition from capital
allocation through pre-existing social networks to capital allocation through
institutional expertise. This transition was not inevitable, and this Note has
proposed several theories for why it happened when it did. In focusing
particularly on the activities of the Town Deposit Fund, it has sought to
develop a new perspective on how local political institutions can shape
economic development. Ultimately, markets are powerful but fragile
institutions, and historical and sociopolitical approaches can be valuable in
understanding how to improve them.
155. See BODENHORN, supra note io, at 72-94; LAMOREAUX, supra note 12, at 52-83.
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APPENDIX I
OCCUPATIONS OF THE BORROWERS FROM THE TOWN DEPOSIT FUND, 1837.
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listed without92 472 occupation
92 469 joiner
dealer in paints and92 4 groceries
92 321 boot and shoe store
92 325 boot and shoe store
92 326 blacksmith
92 471 merchant tailor
92 330 unlisted
unlisted; cabinet92 464 manufacturer
92 543 booksellers & publishers
listed without
92 328 occupation
92 465 livery stable
92 454 boot and shoe store
92 466 Senator (State)
92 423 carver
92 470 livery stable
door lock and latch









93 29 School District
237 joiner
222 unlisted




95 227 of Columbian Register
(with Baldwin)
Volume
Date Grantor Mortgage in Land Page in Occupation as StatedAmount Records Volume in 184o Directory
store 2 Elm c York,
o6/o6/1837 Charles Monson $1,000 95 226 factory Whitney Avenue
c First, h 4 Elm
o6/o5/1837 Joel Hartshon $400 95 221 shoe maker
unlisted (although S.M.
o7/o5/1837 Samuel Bassett $1,000 95 223 Bassett has a looking
glass manufactory)
07/22/1837 Treat Botsford $5oo 95 264 marble and stone yard
o7/o5/1837 Daniel Brown $1,ooo 95 224 builder
o7/2o/1837 Judson Curtiss $750 95 258 joiner
o7/o7/1837 Anson Colt $1,ooo 95 232 unlisted
O7/1O/1837 Abigail Bishop $i,ooo 95 233 unlisted
11/28/1837 Anson Colt $1,ooo 95 472 unlisted
o7/18/1837 Stephen Cooke $750 95 252 unlisted
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An example of a later mortgage deed recorded on a form specially printed for
the New Haven Savings Bank (Mortgage Deed at Vol. 124, p. 1 of Land
Records (Oct. 1, 1847)).
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Of New-Haven.
'A PENNY SAVED IS TWO PENCE CLEAR."
DR. Fw.AwL .
BY-LA.WS.
ARTICLE 1. The Saving Bank of New.Haven shall be open
twice a month, on the first and third Mondays thereof, from tei
o'clock till noon.
' ARTICLE 1I. Deposits of one dollar or any larger sum shall
bo received. The lowest sum which shall be pat on interest,
shall be five dollars, and no fi-actional part o adollar shall be re-
ceived cr be entitled to interest.
ARTICLE 11I. On the first days of January and of July in
each year, there shall be declared a dividend of two and a half
per cent, or five per cent per annum on all sums of five dollars
and upwards, which shall have been deposited for the space of
six months next preceding, and a proportional rate of interest on
sums which shall bare been deposited for a less period, allowing
no interest fir the fractions of a month.
ARTICLE IV. No interest shall 'he paid dn any sums with.
drawn, for tMe time which may have elapsed since the. last' divi-
dead.
ARTICLE V. Dividends not called for within three montls,
aball be added to the principal, and bear interest from the decla-
ratioo of said dividend!.
ARTICLE VI. Whenever any person shall receive his princi-
pal or interest, he shall produce the original book or voucher gi.v-
en himt that the payments may be entered therein.
The cover of a passbook for the ill-fated Saving Bank of New Haven (Passbook
No. ioio, supra note 112).
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JNevoottotr*4 3saut ]MOok
THE NEW HAVEN SAVINGS BANK.
CITY OF NEW HAVEN.
Office, easterly side of Orange Stree, (.nol f Chape Reet,) & open
everr luiriia dqyfromz 9 oldik A. XJ, to 4 Vclft* F, XW.
READ THE RXGULATIONs.
NEW HAVEN:
PRlINT'ED BY 1.' 8. XfNjjA#.
1854.
The inside cover of a passbook for the much more successful New Haven
Savings Bank, the city's first Democratic financial intermediary (New Haven
Savings Bank Passbook, supra note 1o8).
I~I
